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An employer is prohibited from retaliating against an employee who
engages in a protected activity as defined by Title VII, including
opposing discriminatory employment practices or filing charges
alleging discrimination by the employer. The Supreme Court took up
the issue of what constitutes retaliation for purposes of Title VII in an
effort to resolve a split in the circuit courts. This Article examines
the different standards used by the circuits and looks at the Sixth
Circuit case that was appealed to the Supreme Court, as well as the
resolution of that case by the Court. This Article also analyzes the
nature of retaliation and the consequences for the law governing
employment discrimination.
I. Introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits substantive
discrimination by an employer against an employee (§ 703(a) of Title
VII).' Title VII also prohibits retaliation by an employer against an
employee who exercises his or her rights under the Act (§ 704(a) of Title
VII). 2  The Supreme Court has clarified the elements of substantive
discrimination in several cases, 3 but the circuit courts applied a variety of
standards in analyzing retaliation.4 The different standards partly
reflected a disagreement regarding whether a successful plaintiff must
* Assistant Professor, School of Accountancy and Legal Studies, Clemson
University College of Business and Behavioral Science.
1. Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1998).
2. Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a) (2000).
3. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75
(1998).
4. See discussion infra Parts II and III.
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establish the same elements in a case sounding in substantive
discrimination or a case claiming retaliation. The Supreme Court
reconciled the split in the circuits in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. White.5  This Article discusses the split prior to Burlington
Northern and examines the Supreme Court's decision and its
implications for claims of retaliation.
II. The Standards Applied by the Circuits
The circuit courts used four different standards 6 for establishing
actionable retaliation at the time White argued her case in Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White.7 Before proceeding to the
Supreme Court decision, this Article begins with a discussion of the
circuits' various standards, presenting the alternatives that were available
to the Court. The standard used by the Third and the Fourth Circuits8 is
examined first. This was the standard adopted by the Sixth Circuit,9
where White's case originated.
A. The Retaliation Must Be Material and Employment Related
1. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit required that prohibited retaliatory acts by an
employer must be both material and job related.' 0 In Robinson v. City of
Pittsburgh," employee Carmen Robinson began working for the
Pittsburgh Police Department in 1990.12 Robinson alleged that,
beginning in 1992, she was sexually harassed for two years by her
commander.13  The harassment included inappropriate language and
touching.' 4 She filed both an internal complaint and a complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and eventually
5. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White I1), 126 S.Ct. 2405
(2006).
6. See discussion infra Parts II and III.
7. Id. Burlington 126 S.Ct. 2405.
8. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997); Von Gunten
v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001).
9. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 364 F.3d 789, 802 (6th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 797 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2005) (No. 05-259). Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White I1), 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006). See infra Parts
II and III.
10. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 2004).
11. Id.




2007] ESTABLISHING RETALIATION FOR PURPOSES OF TITLE VII 895
filed suit in the district court claiming a hostile work environment, sexual
harassment and retaliation. 15 The district court largely dismissed the suit
in a summary judgment action, and the jury held against Robinson on the
remaining charges. 16 Robinson appealed both the summary judgment
and the trial court's instructions to the jury on her remaining causes of
action.17 As part of her appeal, Robinson claimed that the city retaliated
against her for reporting the harassing conduct, which included,
"restricted job duties, reassignment and subsequent failure to transfer her
out of an assignment in which she was under the direct command of the
alleged harasser, and the issuance of several unsubstantiated oral
reprimands against her," as well as additional questionable and
derogatory comments and breaches of decorum.' 8
The Third Circuit held that such treatment failed to constitute
adverse employment action as required by Title VII's anti-retaliation
section; the conduct must affect the terms and conditions of
employment.' 9 The court cited its prior ruling in Nelson v. Upsala
College20 in which it held that § 704(a) "interdicts an unlawful
employment practice rather than conduct in general which the former
employee finds objectionable.",2' The difficulties Robinson encountered
were not materially adverse to her employment, and, therefore, failed to
constitute retaliation.22 The circuit court affirmed the lower court's
rulings against Robinson.23
2. The Fourth Circuit
As noted, the Sixth Circuit used a standard that required both
materiality and job relatedness.2 4 The standard was also used in the
15. Id. at 1292.
16. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1291.
17. Id. at 1293.
18. Id. at 1300.
19. Id.
20. 51 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 1995).
21. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300 (quoting Nelson, 51 F.3d at 388).
22. Id. at 1299-1300. The Robinson court also specifically addressed the notion of
timing in claims of retaliation. Id. at 1301-03. The court admitted that its prior cases
failed to provide a hard and fast rule regarding whether timing alone could establish
causation in claims of retaliation. Id. at 1302 The court resolved the issue by stating that
timing alone is not generally dispositive of causation when the facts do not evidence a
clear connection between the employee's complaints and the employer's allegedly
retaliatory acts. Id. Such a connection was present in the Third Circuit case of Jalil v.
Avdel, in which the employee was fired two days after filing an EEOC claim. Jalil v.
Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989).
23. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1307.
24. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 364 F.3d 789, 792 (6th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 797 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2005) (No. 05-259). The Sixth
Circuit case is discussed infra Part III.
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Fourth Circuit case of Von Gunten v. Maryland.25 Barbara von Gunten
worked for the Maryland Department of the Environment ("MDE").26
Her position required her to perform sanitary surveys on the Maryland
shore for three months, and for the balance of the year work on a two-
person boat collecting water samples in the Chesapeake Bay.27 After
initially serving on shore, von Gunten began working with her field
supervisor, Vernon Burch.28 Two months later, von Gunten reported to
the head of her section, William Beatty, that Burch was sexually
harassing her by using questionable language, touching her
inappropriately and urinating off the side of the boat. 29 Beatty reported
von Gunten's complaints to his supervisor, John Steinfort. 30  At a
meeting attended by von Gunten, Burch, Beatty and Steinfort, von
Gunten's complaints were discussed and the Maryland anti-harassment
policy was distributed.3 1 In response, Burch denied the harassment, and,
when the pair returned to the boat, von Gunten alleged that Burch's
activities worsened.32
In December 1996, Burch allegedly struck von Gunten with an oar,
and von Gunten then asked Steinfort for a transfer off the boat.33
Steinfort initially resisted the transfer, but eventually agreed.34 Von
Gunten then immediately reported Burch's harassment to Maryland's
internal fair employment office.35 Von Gunten's report was followed by
a call from Steinfort to the fair employment office, in which he stated
that there was insufficient evidence of harassment.36  These
conversations were followed by a written report by von Gunten and
Maryland's investigation of the harassment, in which Maryland
concluded that the harassment was not so "severe as to create an abusive
working environment., 37  After reporting her difficulties to the fair
employment office, von Gunten alleged that Maryland had retaliated
against her by, among other things, removing her state-supplied car,
downgrading her performance evaluations, reassigning her to shore duty,
and generally subjecting her to a hostile work environment.38
25. Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001).
26. Id. at 861.
27. Id. at 861-62.
28. Id. at 862.
29. Id.
30. See id.





36. See Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 862 (4th Cir. 2001).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 862-63.
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Von Gunten filed charges with the EEOC in 1997, and was
subsequently offered a change in assignment.3 9 She rejected the change,
in part because it primarily consisted of shore work, and also because she
would have had to work with Beatty and Steinfort, who had not, in von
Gunten's opinion, adequately dealt with her claims of alleged sexual
harassment. 40 After discussions with the fair employment office, which
failed to address her ongoing difficulties, von Gunten resigned.4'
The EEOC granted von Gunten a right to sue, and she filed in the
district court.4 2 The court granted summary judgment to Maryland
regarding von Gunten's claims of retaliation and constructive discharge,
but allowed the sexual harassment claim.43 The jury that heard the case,
however, found against her.44
When the case was appealed, the Fourth Circuit held that § 704(a)
retaliation claims "require proof of an 'adverse employment action. 
,,45
The court reiterated the holding announced in Ross v. Communications
Satellite Corp. ,46 which applied the same standard to claims sounding in
either §§ 703(a) or 704(a).47 The court rejected the ultimate employment
decision standard used in the Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts.
48  In
rejecting the ultimate employment decision standard, the court noted that
while such actions as hiring or firing may constitute retaliation,
additional actions such as "'retaliatory harassment' can also comprise
adverse employment actions. 49
The Fourth Circuit standard was of no help to von Gunten, since the
court held that von Gunten's treatment failed to meet the necessary
condition of an adverse impact.50  Specifically regarding the allegedly
retaliatory acts, the loss of von Gunten's state car was temporary, the
changes to her performance evaluation were minor, and the ratings she
received actually resulted in a pay increase. 51 Regarding von Gunten's
39. Id. at 863.
40. Id.




45. Id. (quoting Ross v. Commc'n Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir.
1985)).
46. Ross, 759 F.2d at 366.
47. See Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 863 n.1 (4th Cir. 2001).
48. Id. at 864-65 (rejecting the approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) and the Eighth Circuit in
Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997) and Kim v.
Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1060 (8th Cir. 1997)). See infra Part II.B of this review
for a discussion of the ultimate employment decision standard.
49. Id. at 865 (quoting Ross, 759 F.2d at 363).
50. Id. at 867-69.
51. Id. at 867-68.
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assertion that the reassignment to shore duty also constituted retaliation,
the court stated that von Gunten's reassignment was made at von
Gunten's request and in an effort by Maryland to temporarily
accommodate von Gunten while other work was found. 2 The court
further analyzed the reassignment when it stated that, "If the change in
von Gunten's job assignment truly had been significant, if, for example,
it exposed her to more dangerous conditions or stifled advancement ...
then her contention would have merit., 53 These adverse aspects were not
present in von Gunten's case.54 Von Gunten also had alleged that
Maryland mishandled administrative issues, including inappropriately
suspending her with pay, and subjecting her to hyper-scrutiny.55 But, in
the court's words "terms, conditions, or benefits of a person's
employment do not typically, if ever, include general immunity from the
application of basic employment policies or exemption from a state
,,56agency's disciplinary procedures.
Lastly, concerning the issue of retaliatory harassment allegedly
created by Maryland when it created a hostile work environment, the
court cited Ross 57 and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.58 for the
proposition that while the hostile work environment claim might be
successful, it must demonstrate a relationship with the worker's
employment, and the employer's actions must be "'severe or pervasive
enough' to create 'an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive."'' 59 The Fourth Circuit agreed with the lower court
ruling that, since the employer's actions took place sporadically over the
course of a year and a half, the actions may not have produced an
abusive environment to a reasonable person.6 °
52. See id at 868-69.
53. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 868.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 869.
56. Id.
57. Ross v. Commc'n Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 363 (4th Cir. 1985).
58. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Harris concerns substantive
discrimination. Id. at 20. As discussed infra Part IV.B, Justice Alito revisited the
arguments in Harris in his concurrence in White I, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2418-22 (2006).
Justice Alito raised his concern that the Court's interpretation of materiality would
require a particularized analysis dependent on the circumstances of the retaliation; what is
material for one may not be material to another. Id. at 2421.
59. Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 870 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harris,
510 U.S. at 21).
60. Id. As discussed infra Part IV.A, the reasonable person standard was similarly
important to the Supreme Court in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White II),
126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006).
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B. The Retaliation Must Pose an Ultimate Employment Decision
The Fifth and the Eighth Circuits applied the strictest standard to
cases alleging retaliation, which was least amenable to an employee's
assertion of retaliation.6'
1. The Fifth Circuit
In Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,62 the plaintiff was subjected to an
allegedly hostile work environment and sexual harassment by two co-
workers while participating in an on-the-job training program at Eastman
Kodak ("Eastman").63 Mattem filed an EEOC charge and claimed that
her supervisors knew about the harassment, condoned it and took no
action.64 An internal investigation of her claims resulted in one of the
alleged abusers taking early retirement, and no action being taken against
the second.65 Mattem filed a claim with the district court and alleged,
among other things, that Eastman retaliated against her.66
The court's analysis of § 704(a), and its application to the facts,
took into consideration five acts of allegedly retaliatory conduct occuring
after Mattern complained of discrimination. 67 First, supervisors were
sent to her home when she complained of a work-related illness and took
a day of vacation.68 Such a visit was unusual for the employer.69
Second, Mattem was discussing her discriminatory treatment at
Eastman's human resource department when she was reprimanded for
not being at her workstation.70 Third, Mattern experienced hostility in
the form of her fellow workers being uncivil toward her.71 In addition,
her locker was broken into and some of her tools stolen.72  Fourth,
Mattern became ill, and in her doctor's opinion the illness was
attributable to her treatment at Eastman.73 Eastman failed to respond
when informed of her doctor's diagnosis.74 Fifth, Mattem, who had
previously received good work evaluations, was given negative
61. See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997); see Manning
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1997).
62. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997).
63. Id. at 703.
64. Id. at 704.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 705-06.





73. Id. at 706.
74. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 706.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
performance reviews.75 Consequently, she was told that she could be
terminated, and then did not receive a pay increase.
7 6
The court stated that in order to prove retaliation, Mattern must
establish that Eastman's actions were "ultimate employment decisions,"
"such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and
compensating."" None of the actions rose to the level of ultimate
employment decisions in the court's view. 8 "Doubtless, some of these
actions may have had a tangential effect on conditions of employment;
but.., an ultimate employment decision had not occurred., 79 The court
pointed to its ruling in Dollis v. Rubin,80 as replicating its present
standard.8' The court furthermore explained, regarding Mattern's poor
work evaluations, that "an employee may not complain that not obtaining
a position was retaliation if she was not qualified for that position in the
first place. 82
2. The Eighth Circuit
The plaintiffs in Manning v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
83
complained of retaliation and sexual harassment, including "daily
descriptions of [a co-worker's] body parts, explicit updates on his sexual
activity, and crude propositions made under the threat of adverse
consequences or the promise of special favors. 84  The employees'
complaints to supervisors went unanswered.85 When a lawsuit was filed,
the allegations led a jury to hold that the actions constituted a breach of
Arkansas law for the tort of outrage.86 These same actions failed to
prove retaliation, according to the district court, and in an appeal of the
district court decision to the Eighth Circuit, the court stated "not
75. Id.
76. Id. The evidence at trial suggested that the poor evaluations resulted from
Mattem's inability to perform certain tasks properly. Id.
77. Id. at 707 (quoting Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 708 (citing to Hill v. Miss. State Employment Serv., 918 F.2d 1233 (5th
Cir. 1990)).
80. 77 F.3d 777 (5th Cir. 1995).
81. See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707 (citing Dollis, 77 F.3d at 781-82). Note that the
Supreme Court would doubtless agree with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion about the
retaliatory nature of the work evaluations, but for reasons relating to materiality, rather
than a sense of the employee's immunity when the worker is not qualified. If in fact
Mattem could not do the work, Eastman did not retaliate when it rated her poorly, and
Mattem suffered no materially adverse harm when she was so evaluated. See id. at 708.
82. Id. at 709 (citing Gonzales v. Carlin, 907 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1990)).
83. 127 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 1997).
84. Id. at 691.
85. Id. at 689-90.
86. Id. at 692.
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everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse
action. 87 Only actions that constitute ultimate employment decisions
were a violation of Title VII under the Eighth Circuit's reasoning.88
C. The Ninth Circuit and its Application of the EEOC Guidelines
The EEOC standard, announced in the agency's 1998 Guidelines
concerning retaliation, 89 differs from the standard as argued by the
Government when White appealed. 90 The Government insisted that
§ 704(a) applies only to tangible employment actions.9 The EEOC
Guidelines impose no such requirement.9 2  The differing perspectives
were most pronounced in the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Ray v.
Henderson.93 Ray is unique, not only for the standard it applied, but also
because it involved a worker whose claim focused on retaliation, not
substantive retaliation.94
William Ray worked for the post office in rural California for
twenty-eight years.95 When women in his office alleged gender bias and
harassment, Ray echoed their concerns at two meetings held in part to
address the issue.9 6 The postmaster denied the abuse, and no action was
taken. 97 Ray then joined in a letter with two co-workers that complained
about the office's treatment of women, and the letter was sent to the
postmaster's supervisor.98 At a meeting held to confront the ongoing
concerns, the postmaster threatened that he "might have to change [his]
whole approach to management... [he] left [Ray] alone... [he] may
have to change that." 99 The postmaster berated Ray and changed his
87. Id. (quoting Montandon v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir.
1997)).
88. Id. The holding in Manning repeated the standard imposed by the Eighth Circuit
in Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997), which discussed claims for
both substantive and retaliatory discrimination. See id. at 1143. The court held that the
standard in either case required that the employee establish an adverse employment
action; the employer's actions must materially affect the worker's terms and conditions of
employment. Id. at 1145. The court utilized the "ultimate employment action" language
and stated that lateral transfers, absent a materially adverse affect, do not violate Title
VII. Id. at 1144.
89. EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, "Retaliation," 1 8008 at 6512 (July 31, 1998).
90. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Burlington
N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co., v. White, 126 S. Ct. 797 (2006) (No. 05-259), 2006 WL 622123.
91. White II, 126 S. Ct. at 2411.
92. EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, "Retaliation," 8008 at 6512 (July 31, 1998).
93. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
94. Id. at 1239.




99. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1237-38.
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work schedule, making Ray's work more difficult to complete, and
cancelled employment meetings at which the allegations of gender bias
would likely be considered.'00
Ray filed complaints with the EEOC alleging, among other charges,
retaliation. 0 1  After notification of the complaint, the postmaster
escalated his ill treatment of Ray. 10 2 In a district court ruling, the court
held for the post office on the charge of retaliation and Ray appealed.
10 3
No dispute existed as to whether Ray engaged in activities
encouraged by Title VII; Ray offered his support to co-workers who
believed that gender bias was poisoning the atmosphere of the post
office. 10 4 Rather, the issue in Ray concerned whether the post office's
actions were in fact retaliatory and, therefore, constituted violations of
Title VII.105
The court held, in its interpretation of § 704(a) that "an action is
cognizable as an adverse employment action if it is reasonably likely to
deter employees from engaging in protected activity."'' 0 6  The court
adopted the standard contained in the EEOC Guidelines, which states
that an adverse employment action is "any adverse treatment that is
based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the
charging party or others from engaging in protected activity."' 7 Neither
materiality nor job relatedness were required. 08 Application of the
standard meant that "lateral transfers, unfavorable job references, and
changes in work schedules"' 0 9 could all constitute retaliation, as did
Ray's treatment at the hands of the postmaster.'10 The court specifically
rejected the ultimate employment decision standard of the Eighth Circuit
and remanded the case for consideration consistent with the EEOC
standard."
100. Id. at 1238.
101. Id. at 1239.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1237.
105. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240.
106. Id. at 1243.
107. Id. at 1242-43; EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, "Retaliation," 8008 at 6512
(July 31, 1998).
108. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240-41.
109. Id. at 1243.
110. Id. at 1244.
111. Id. at1246.
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D. A Material Retaliation Need Not Be Employment Related
The Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuit Courts" 12 applied
a standard that the Supreme Court ultimately applied. 1 3 The reasoning
of the circuits comes primarily from two cases.
1. The Seventh Circuit
Chrissie Washington claimed that her employer reassigned her to a
work schedule that did not allow her to care for her child (who had Down
syndrome) after Washington complained of race discrimination at the
state agency where she worked. 1 4 After a magistrate court ruled against
Washington on her complaint of retaliation, Washington appealed to the
Seventh Circuit." 5  The court stated, consistent with its opinion in
Herrnreiter v. Chicago Housing Authority,116 that retaliation need not
entail an "adverse employment action."'" 7  The court stated that not
"every unwelcome response is forbidden retaliation."' 18  Indeed, the
court stated "Congress could make any identifiable trifle actionable, but
the undefined word 'discrimination' does not itself command judges to
supervise the minutiae of personnel management. Even the definition of
'tangible employment action' in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 19
uses 'significant' three times, reminding us that life's little reverses are
not causes of litigation."'1
20
The court held that the standards for liability under §§ 703(a) and
704(a) were different. 121  Substantive discrimination concerns
discrimination "with respect to [the worker's] compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment."'122 Retaliation is a form of
discrimination prohibited by Title VII, and, as such, it may occur in
many ways, none of which is necessarily limited to employment-related
conduct:
23
112. Washington v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 659 (7th Cir.
2005); Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1218-19 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
113. Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White I), 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2416 (2006).
114. Washington, 420 F.3d at 659.
115. Id.
116. 315 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2002).
117. Washington, 420 F.3d 658, 660; Herrnreiter, 315 F.3d at 745-46.
118. Washington, 420 F.3d at 660.
119. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (examining the
definition of a tangible employment action, which is also discussed supra in Part V of
this Article).
120. Washington, 420 F.3d at 661.
121. Id.at660-61.
122. Id. at 660 (quoting § 703(a) (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a))).
123. See id. at 659-60.
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The state's Department of Revenue might have audited Washington's
tax returns in response to her complaint to the EEOC, or hired a
private detective to search for a disreputable tidbit that could be used
to intimidate her into withdrawing the complaint. When the
employer's response does not affect a complainant's terms and
conditions of employment, it is vain to look for an adverse
"employment" decision. 124
Nevertheless, while conduct that constitutes retaliation need not be
employment related, the court held that it still must be material.
25
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit explained that the context of the
employer's actions was important in deciding whether the acts were
material. 126 "[A]n act that would be immaterial in some situations is
material in others." 127 In concert with the requirement for materiality,
the court's standard included a judgment as to whether the employer's
actions would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or suggesting a
charge of discrimination.
21
Applying the standard to the facts in Washington, the change in
schedule was specifically designed to significantly inconvenience
Washington's ability to care for her son.129 Such a change may have
mattered little to other employees, encompassing only, for example, a
switch in the supervisor who monitored the employee under one
scheduling assignment, and not the other, but it was a material burden to
Washington.1 30 The employer's actions may have constituted retaliation,
and the court remanded the case for a judgment consistent with its
standard. 1
31
2. The District of Columbia Circuit
The employee in Rochon v. Gonzales,132 Donald Rochon, worked in
the Omaha, Nebraska office of the FBI. 133  Rochon had formally
protested discrimination in that office as far back as 1984.134 Internal
124. Id. at 660.
125. Id. at 661.
126. See Washington, 420 F.3d at 661-62.
127. Id. at 661; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (examining
context in determining materiality; see discussion infra Part IV.B).




132. See Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
133. See id. at 1213; see infra Part IV.B (discussing the analysis of Rochon in Justice
Alito's concurring opinion in White II); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White
(White II), 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2418 (2006).
134. See Rochon. 438 F.3d at 1213.
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investigations found that the FBI subjected Rochon to racial
discrimination and retaliation.' 35 As part of the settlement of the matter,
the FBI agreed not to repeat its retaliatory acts against Rochon.
136
Nonetheless, the FBI did take retaliatory action against Rochon, which
led to Rochon suing, and a second settlement agreement being
reached. 137 Rochon then claimed that the FBI took relation against him
yet again when it failed to respond to threats made by a federal prisoner
against Rochon and his wife. 38 Rochon filed suit in the district court
claiming that the FBI's actions constithted retaliation.1
39
The FBI's failure to respond to the threats made against Rochon and
his family occurred outside the workplace, and, therefore, failed to
constitute either a change in the terms of Rochon's employment or in his
work conditions. 140  The lack of response was, however, an arguably
improper act. 141 Insisting that the actions taken by the employer need not
be employment related, Rochon referred to the Supreme Court case of
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. 142 In Robinson, an employee of Shell Oil,
Charles Robinson, was fired by Shell Oil. 143  Robinson filed charges
claiming that the firing was discriminatory. 44 In response to a request
for information from one of Robinson's subsequent, potential employers,
Shell provided negative references regarding Robinson, and he alleged
that the negative references constituted retaliation. 145  The Supreme
Court granted review of the case to settle a split in the circuits
concerning whether a former employee could claim a § 704(a)




138. See id. at 1213-14.
139. See id.
140. See Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1216-17.
141. See, e.g., id. at 1218 (discussing the court's analysis and belief that an unjust
result would occur if actions such as those by the employer in this case were held not to
be retaliatory).
142. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
143. See id. at 339.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 340. The Fourth Circuit had held that former employees could not sue
under section 704(a) in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325 (1996). This decision was
reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court, 519 U.S. 337 (1997). All the other circuits that
had considered the issue generally held that former employees could maintain the action:
the Second Circuit, Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2nd 1978); the
Third Circuit, Charlton v. Paramus Bd. Of Ed., 23 F.3d 194, 198-200 (3d Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1022 (1994); the Ninth Circuit, O'Brien v. Sky Chiefs, Inc., 670 F.2d
864, 869 ( 9th Cir. 1982); the Tenth Circuit, Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce,
565 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1977); and the Eleventh Circuit, Bailey v. USX Corp.,
850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11 th Cir. 1988). The Seventh Circuit had held in Reed v. Shepard,
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employees.
147
First, the Robinson Court noted that, "[i]nsofar as § 704(a) expressly
protects employees from retaliation for filing a 'charge' under title VII,
and a charge under § 703(a) alleging unlawful discharge would
necessarily be brought by a former employee, it is far more consistent to
include former employees within the scope of 'employees' protected by
§ 704(a).' 48 Second, to the extent an employer could retaliate, as long
as its actions were taken only against former employees, the employer
might silence its current workers, xho feared retaliation for asserting or
cooperating in support of Title VII protections. 49 The Robinson Court
stated that, "[I]t would be destructive of this purpose of the antiretaliation
provision for an employer to be able to retaliate with impunity against an
entire class of acts under Title VII-for example, complaints regarding
discriminatory termination."5 0
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the employee, Rochon, and the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Robinson.'5' The D.C. Circuit understood
the Robinson holding to similarly require that violations of § 704(a)
include not only employment-related actions, but also actions outside the
workplace. 52  The following example demonstrates the logic of the
Rochon court's result and the problems created if it had held otherwise.
An employer fires a worker in violation of the substantive discrimination
protection of § 703(a), and the worker files a complaint with the EEOC.
In response, the employer takes actions against the former employee
(e.g., by supplying incorrect and deleterious job references), hoping that
the former worker will drop the charges or that other workers will
recognize that they may suffer similarly dire consequences for claiming
discrimination or assisting in an investigation of discrimination. If the
employer was statutorily harmless under § 704(a), the former worker
would have no recourse, other than § 703(a). All similarly situated
workers would suffer the same fate under this reasoning. The Rochon
court recognized the unfairness of maintaining that only employment
related actions constituted a violation of the anti-retaliation provisions of
Title VII, which "'would be destructive of [the] purpose of the
antiretaliation provision,' namely, '[m]aintaining unfettered access to
939 F.2d 484, 492-93 (4th Cir. 1991), that former employees could not sue under these
circumstances, but the circuit reconsidered this position in Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel,
Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 886 (4th Cir. 1996).
147. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
148. Id. at 345.
149. See id. at 345-46.
150. Id. at 346.
151. See Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
152. See id.
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statutory remedial mechanisms."", 153 If the need to show employment
relatedness is eliminated, the result changes, and the former employee in
the example may sue under § 704(a). And, logically, an action taken by
the employer against a former employee is, by definition, an action
outside the workplace. 1
54
The Government argued, as it would in the Supreme Court appeal of
White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., 155 that the actions
must be employment related, contrary to the EEOC Guidelines, which do
not require job relatedness, instead stating that retaliation includes
actions "that [are] based on a retaliatory motive and [are] reasonably
likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected
activity. ' 56  The Rochon court agreed, however, with the Seventh
Circuit's ruling in Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co.; 57 actions "not ostensibly
employment related" still may be retaliatory.' 58
As it had in prior cases dealing with retaliation, 59 the Rochon court
required the employer's actions to be material. 160 The court repeated the
statement of the First Circuit, which said, "'there is room for a de
minimus threshold' in claims of retaliatory conduct.' 61 The Rochon
court stated,
The retaliatory conduct Rochon alleges, to wit, the FBI's refusal to
investigate, as it would ordinarily do for any member of the public, a
death threat made against him by a federal prison inmate, meets this
threshold of significance. In other words, a reasonable FBI agent
well might be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity
protected by Title VII if he knew that doing so would leave him
unprotected by the FBI in the face of threats against him or his
153. Id. at 1218 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346).
154. The Rochon court dealt with the anti-retaliation provision under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). 438 F.3d at 1217.
The court noted that a prior D.C. Circuit case dealing with the provision, Passer v.
American Chemical Supply, 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991), concerned a retaliation that
took the form of a cancelled symposium, which had been planned in honor of the
employee. The court held that the cancellation was made in response to the worker's
allegations that his employer violated the ADEA, and, since "the statute does not limit its
reach only to acts of retaliation that take the form of cognizable employment actions such
as discharge, transfer or demotion," the cancellation was retaliatory and in breach of the
ADEA. Id. at 331.
155. 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2004), aff'd, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006).
156. 364 F.3d at 798 (quoting the EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, "Retaliation,"
8008 (1998)).
157. 183 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999).
158. Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Aviles v. Cornell Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598,
606 (7th Cir. 1999)).
159. See, e.g., Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
160. Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219.
161. Id. (quoting Randlett v. Shalala, 118 F.3d 857, 862 (1st Cir. 1997)).
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62
The court then remanded the case for a judgment in accordance with its
standard. 163
III. The Sixth Circuit: White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry.
Co.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in December 2005 regarding
the appeal of White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. 1
64
The Court heard oral arguments four months later and issued its decision
in June 2006.165 The Sixth Circuit case, reviewed by the Court,
concerned whether the employee, Sheila White, established that her
employer, Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. ("Burlington
Northern") violated Title VII's prohibitions against retaliatory discharge
in the context of alleged employment discrimination.'
66
A. Background
Sheila White worked as a forklift operator at the Burlington
Northern Tennessee Yard in Memphis. 67  On September 16, 1997,
approximately three months after her hire, White complained to the
roadmaster of the yard as well as to other company officials about
alleged sexual harassment committed by her immediate supervisor.
168
Shortly thereafter, the company investigated White's complaint,
suspended the supervisor and ordered him to attend anti-discrimination
training sessions regarding sexual harassment. 69  On September 26,
1997, the yardmaster told White about Burlington Northern's
investigation and suspension of the supervisor. 70 The yardmaster also
told White that her fellow workers had complained about White holding
the job of forklift operator, which the workers argued was less arduous
and "cleaner" than other track laborer positions, within which the forklift
162. Id. at 1219-20.
163. Id. at 1220.
164. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 797 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2005) (No. 05-259).
165. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White II), 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006).
166. White I, 364 F.3d at 794. Even if a claim of retaliation is not made together with
a claim of substantive discrimination, the Supreme Court's holding in White H may
provide protection against the retaliation, i.e., even if no substantive discrimination
occurred, retaliation in violation of Title VII may be actionable.
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operator position was classified.'17  The workers had not disparaged
White's performance, but did question whether a less senior woman
should hold the job, rather than a man.' 72  At the same meeting, the
yardmaster informed White that because of her fellow workers'
complaints, he was reassigning White to a standard track laborer
position, which did not require the qualifications needed for the job of
forklift operator.173
White filed charges of sex discrimination and retaliation with the
EEOC in October 1997.174 She subsequently filed additional charges
with the EEOC in December, again complaining of retaliation. 75 In her
second charge, White alleged that the yardmaster "had placed her under
surveillance and was checking on her daily activities.'
176
After White filed her second charge with the EEOC, an incident
occurred in which White was alleged to have been insubordinate, and, as
a result, the yardmaster suspended her without pay. 77 A foreman of the
group with which White worked told White that the railroad was "trying
to get rid of her"'178 and that Burlington Northern considered her a
"troublemaker."' 179  White's suspension occurred seven days after she
filed her second round of charges with the EEOC, and the yardmaster
knew at the time of her suspension that such charges had been filed.' 80
Consistent with company policy, the suspension would automatically
become a termination unless White grieved the discipline with her union,
which she did.181 White then filed a third set of charges with the EEOC
alleging retaliation. 182  A Burlington Northern manager investigated
White's alleged insubordination (which had prompted her suspension).'8 3
Thirty-seven days into the suspension, the manager found the suspension
to be unwarranted and ordered White's reinstatement with backpay.
84
After exhausting her relief with the EEOC, White filed suit in the federal
171. Id.
172. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 364 F.3d 789, 792 (6th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 797 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2005) (No. 05-259).
173. Id. at 792-93.
174. Id. at 793.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 794.
178. White I, 364 F.3d at 794.
179. Id.. It is unclear whether the foreman's statements were made to White simply
to provide information, whether the foreman gave the statements to White to help White





184. White 1, 364 F.3d at 794.
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district court alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of
Title VI.' 5
The jury that heard White's case found against White on the charge
of sex discrimination, but returned a verdict for White on the charge of
retaliation and awarded her $43,500.186 Burlington Northern appealed
the district court's decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
87
The first appeal of the case, heard by a three-member panel of the
Sixth Circuit, reversed the jury's verdict regarding retaliation, and found
that the employer had not retaliated through its suspension or transfer of
White. 18 8 White appealed, again to the Sixth Circuit, and the decision of
that court,189 sitting en banc, is discussed in the next section. 90 While
the en banc decision was ultimately appealed and heard by the Supreme
Court, the Sixth Circuit's decision is informative to an understanding of
the arguments brought to bear in retaliation cases and the Supreme
Court's resolution of the case.
B. The Decision of the Sixth Circuit
1. The Suspension
The circuit court examined the retaliation provision of Title VII,
§ 704(a) of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)),' 9' which states:
(a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or
participating in enforcement proceedings
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment.., because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
185. Id.
186. Id. In an additional motion, White asked the district court for attorney fees, and
the court awarded her $54,285, or 80% of those fees. Id.
187. Id.
188. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 310 F.3d 443, 443 (6th Cir. 2002).
189. White 1, 364 F.3d 789.
190. See also Michael Clarkson & Ann Thomas, Recent Developments in Employer-
employee Relations, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 369, 378-79 (2005). 364 F.3d at
794.
191. See Part IV.A for a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis of the retaliation
provision of Title VII.
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investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 192
The Sixth Circuit cited Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,
193
("Ellerth") noting that "not just any discriminatory act by an employer
constitutes discrimination under Title VII.... Employment actions that
are de minimus are not actionable. ...194 According to the Sixth Circuit,
the Ellerth195 Court required that successful Title VII claims involve a
"tangible employment action," or, in the Sixth Circuit's restatement of
this term, an "adverse employment action."'196 The Sixth Circuit quoted
its previous ruling in Primes v. Reno, where it stated that "[i]f every low
evaluation or other action by an employer that makes an employee
unhappy or resentful were considered an adverse action, Title VII would
be triggered by supervisor criticism or even facial expressions indicating
displeasure."'' 97 The Sixth Circuit, thereby, equated the standards under
§§ 703(a) and 704(a), requiring materiality and job relatedness for
actionable violations under either section.
The court proceeded to recount the Geisler v. Folsom198 case, which
was the first instance in which the Sixth Circuit was asked to decide
whether the plaintiff had proved an adverse employment action.1 99
Geisler held that general tension arising after an employee filed EEOC
charges failed to constitute retaliation for purposes of Title VII. 200
Shortly after Geisler, the Sixth Circuit addressed the termination of an
employee in Jackson v. RKO Bottlers of Toledo, Inc.20  The Sixth
Circuit in White v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. also cited
holdings cited by Jackson from the Fifth Circuit,
20 2 the Tenth Circuit,20 3
and Eleventh Circuit, 20 4 stating that a "plaintiff must establish: (1) that
he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) that he was the subject
of adverse employment action; and (3) that there exists a casual [sic] link
192. Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a) (2000).
193. 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
194. White I, 364 F.3d at 795.
195. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
196. White 1, 364 F.3d at 795. The court states that, while the Supreme Court uses the
phrase "tangible employment action," and the Sixth Circuit uses "adverse employment
action," the phrases capture "the same concept." Id. at 796 n. 1.
197. Id. at 795 (quoting Primes v. Reno, 190 F.3d 765, 767 (6th Cir. 1999)).
198. 735 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1984).
199. White I, 364 F.3d 796.
200. Id. at 796; Geisler, 735 F.2d at 994.
201. 743 F.2d 370 (6th Cir. 1984).
202. Whatley v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 632 F.2d 1325, 1328 (5th Cir.
1980).
203. Burr-us v. United Tel. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982).
204. Jones v. Lumberjack Meats, Inc., 680 F.2d 98, 101 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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between his protected activity and the adverse action of his employer."
20 5
All of these cases addressed a termination, but none dealt with
employment actions that fell "short" of an actual discharge, which is in
contrast to the employee in White who was not terminated.20 6
Continuing its recitation of the Sixth Circuit's prior cases that dealt
with the concept of an adverse employment action, the court looked at a
reassignment in the context of a retaliation claim in Yates v. Avco
Corp.20 7 Yates held that a temporary reassignment without a reduction in
pay or in benefits failed to constitute retaliation. 20 8 The Sixth Circuit
later held, in Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc.,°209 that proof of
employment discrimination "must show that [the plaintiff] suffered a
'materially adverse change in the terms of [his or] her employment....
A mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities' or a
'bruised ego' is not enough to constitute an adverse employment
action. 210 In 1999, the Sixth Circuit repeated the standard announced in
Kocsis, and defined an adverse employment action in Hollins v.
Atlantic2 1 as a "materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of
,,212[plaintiff's] employment. In combination with Hollins, the Sixth
Circuit noted that Kocsis stood for the proposition that a reassignment
alone, without an accompanying adverse employment action, will not
itself constitute an adverse employment action, but to the extent the
action is accompanied by, for example, a reduction in salary, the
employment action may be adverse.1 3
Stating that Kocsis was the seminal case in analyzing what
constitutes an adverse employment action, 21 4 the Sixth Circuit declared
205. White L 364 F.3d at 796 (quoting 743 F.2d at 375).
206. White 1,, 364 F.3d at 796; Burlington Supreme Court, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006); see
discussion supra Part IV.
207. 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th Cir. 1987).
208. Id.
209. Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876 (6th Cir. 1996).
210. White 1, 364 F.3d at 797 (quoting Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt. Inc., 97 F.3d 876,
885-86 (6th Cir. 1996)).
211. 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999).
212. White I, 364 F.3d at 796 (quoting Hollins v. Atlantic Co. 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th
Cir. 1999)).
213. Id. at 797. This ruling is similar to the Supreme Court's decision in
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004), discussed supra Part V, which
held that in the context of a constructive discharge, the employer's actions were not a
tangible employment action absent a precipitating factor that itself could be considered a
tangible employment action. Id. at 149. In Suders, the employee's discharge was
voluntary and the employer's alleged discrimination that prompted the termination was
not addressed by the employee through the employer's anti-discrimination policy. Id. at
129-130. To the extent the employer's actions were adverse, the employee failed to try to
rectify them, as advised by the Supreme Court in Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth (524 U.S.
742, 765 (1998)) and then in Suders. Id. at 152.
214. Kocsis concerned a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
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that the Supreme Court in Ellerth2 15 relied on the language in Kocsis (as
well as decisions from several other circuits2 16) in defining tangible
employment actions. 217 "'A tangible employment action constitutes a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a significant change in benefits. ' ' 218 The Sixth Circuit
also noted that tangible employment actions, as pointed out by Ellerth,
generally inflict "direct economic harm. 219
Both the plaintiff and the EEOC had urged the Sixth Circuit to
adopt the EEOC's definition of an adverse employment action: "any
adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably
likely to deter a charging party or others from engaging in protected
activity., 220 The EEOC argued that both the Sixth Circuit's prior rulings,
and its requirement that the action pose a materially adverse change in
the terms of employment, failed to complement Title VII's mission to
prevent retaliation. 221  The standard, as endorsed by the EEOC, was
applied by the Ninth Circuit in Ray v. Henderson,222 which did not
identify a restriction on the nature of a retaliatory act, or "a minimum
level of severity for actionable discrimination., 223 Under the EEOC's
interpretation, any intentionally discriminatory act, therefore, qualifies as
§ 12112(a) (1995). Kocsis, 97 F.3d at,882. The Kocsis court stated that the employee
suffered no materially adverse employment action when she could show no relationship
between the employer's actions and her employment. Id. at 886-87.
215. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
216. Spring v. Sheboygan Area Sch. Dist., 865 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1989); Crady v.
Liberty Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993); Flaherty v. Gas
Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456 (7th Cir. 1994).
217. White II, 364 F.3d at 797.
218. Id. (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
219. Id. at 798 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762). In a footnote, the court described
two cases that also considered the notion of how adverse the employer's action must be.
Id. at 798 n.3. An adverse employment action did not exist in Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188
F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999), since the employee in that case merely suffered a lower
performance rating and nothing more. Id. (citing Hollins,188 F.3d at 662). Similarly, the
plaintiff in Bowman v. Shawnee State University, 220 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2000), failed to
describe an adverse employment action when he was temporarily removed from a
university committee for ten days, and his pay was never docked, nor was his position as
an instructor ever suspended. Id. (Bowman.220 F.3d at 461-62).
220. EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, "Retaliation," 8008 at 6512 (July 31, 1998);
White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 364 F.3d 789, 798 (6th Cir. 2004),
cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 797 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2005) (No. 05-259).
221. White I, 364 F.3dat 798.
222. 217 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000); see also discussion of Ray v. Henderson,
217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000) supra Part II. C.
223. White I, 364 F.3d at 798 (quoting Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243). The court also notes
that Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996) states that "[t]here is nothing in the
law of retaliation that restricts the type of retaliatory acts that might be visited upon an
employee who seeks to invoke her rights by filing a complaint." Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334.
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an illegal retaliation in violation of § 704(a) of Title VII, regardless of
materiality; the standard eliminates the need to find that the act was
material. The court stated that EEOC Guidelines were not binding, but
were important, in that "they 'constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance.' ' 224  The court then proceeded to ignore the EEOC
guidelines.225
The Sixth Circuit interpreted Title VII's retaliation provisions as
prohibiting not "any form of discrimination,, 226 but only those acts that
"deter employees from engaging in protected activity." 227 In the court's
understanding, its materiality standard implies that all actionable claims,
either substantive or retaliatory discrimination, arise from genuinely
adverse employment actions, and suits involving mere "trivialities"
would be summarily dismissed.228  Rather than creating a list of all
possible adverse employment actions, the court stated that it must
consider "indices that might be unique to a particular situation 2 29 in
deciding whether an employment action was adverse.
230
The Sixth Circuit's reticence to adopt a purportedly comprehensive
list of adverse employment actions echoed the Supreme Court's
sentiments in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders. 3' Suders required the
Court to determine whether or not a constructive discharge constituted a
tangible employment action (i.e., an adverse employment action) for
purposes of allowing an employer to raise an affirmative defense to
charges of employment discrimination.232 Citing its earlier decision in
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth,233 the Suders Court reiterated that
tangible employment actions include "such [actions] as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.,
234
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the eight-to-one majority in Suders, stated
that tangible employment actions have in common the official actions of
224. White 1, 364 F.3d at 798 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986)).
225. Id. at 799.
226. Id.
227. Id. The EEOC acknowledged that "petty slights and trivial annoyances" would
not trigger a Title VII violation. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. (quoting Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996)).
230. White 1, 364 F.3d at 799.
231. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004); see infra Part V for a
discussion of Suders.
232. Suders, 542 U.S. at 139. See infra Part V for the discussion of tangible
employment actions.
233. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
234. Suders, 542 U.S. at 139 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761).
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the employer.2 35 In the case below, the Third Circuit had noted that the
Ellerth2 36 list of tangible employment actions was non-exhaustive.2 37
The Supreme Court in its review of Suders essentially agreed, but held
that the significant factor distinguishing each action on the list, from
other actions that should not be included, was the official nature of the
action. 238 In either interpretation, the list is non-exhaustive, but it is
under what circumstances a court should add to the list, making an
employer's action tangibly adverse, that differentiates the Third Circuit
ruling in Easton from that of the Supreme Court's review and decision in
Suders.2 3 9 The Sixth Circuit reinforced this sentiment when stating that
"it is impossible to list every possible employment action that falls into
the definition of adverse employment action. 2 4 °
In furtherance of its analysis, the Sixth Circuit touted the
practicality of using a standard that rested on the necessity of finding an
adverse employment action in any Title VII case, whether it rests on
violations under § 703(a) or § 704(a).24' The court's reasoning departed
from the arguments. raised by the plaintiff and the EEOC, as well as the
defense raised by the employer. 242 "Having a different standard for the
different provisions of Title VII would be burdensome and unjustified by
the text of the statute, which uses the same phrase 'discriminate against'
in each of its anti-discrimination provisions. 243 The court attempted,
therefore, to achieve a pragmatic solution to two problems: (1) the
difficulty of divining an exhaustive list of all possible adverse
employment actions, which even the Supreme Court believed was
235. Id. at 131.
236. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
237. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 456 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761).
238. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 148-50.
239. Prior to Suders, several federal courts, including those sitting in the Second and
Eighth Circuits, held that the Ellerth list of tangible employment actions constituted non-
exhaustive examples of adverse actions. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Atrium Door & Window
Co., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Ariz. 2002); Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160
(N.D. Iowa 2000). Regarding an attempt to list all actionable offenses in the context of a
retaliation, the Seventh Circuit in Knox v. State of Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996)
also stated that, "The law deliberately does not take a 'laundry list' approach to
retaliation, because unfortunately its forms are as varied as the human imagination will
permit." Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334. The Supreme Court in Suders, discussed in infra Part
V, held that a constructive discharge was not a tangible employment action. Suders, 542
U.S. at 148. In White's case, the Sixth Circuit held, however, that the employer's
treatment did constitute a tangible, i.e. an adverse, employment action. White v.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 364 F.3d 789, 800-03 (6th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted, 126 S.Ct. 797 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2005) (No. 05-259).
240. White I, 364 F.3d at 799.
241. Id
242. Id.; see supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
243. White 1, 364 F.3d at 799.
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244unnecessary, and (2) the issue of what standard to use when adding
adverse employment actions to the list.245  The court solved both
problems, in its estimation, by announcing a uniform standard, applicable
to all Title VII claims.246
The court turned to an explanation of its standard, which required a
plaintiff to establish that the employer undertook a materially adverse
employment action, i.e., in the court's words, "any kind of adverse
action, 247 that was material and job related. Materiality is the significant
component of the standard that distinguishes it from the standard argued
by the employee, White, and on which standard White nevertheless won
in the Sixth Circuit.248 As later noted by the Government in its Amicus
Brief to the Supreme Court when White appealed:
The materially adverse employment action test not only follows the
path marked by Ellerth, but provides a workable, objective, and
uniform standard for adjudicating both direct discrimination and
retaliation claims under Title VII. Under the materially adverse
actions standard, an employer's conduct must cause "objectively
tangible harm" to be actionable, and thus "[p]urely subjective
injuries, such as dissatisfaction with a reassignment,... public
humiliation or loss of reputation" would not qualify as a matter of
law.
249
The court specifically rejected the standard raised by Burlington
Northern, which would have made only "ultimate employment
decisions" subject to a Title VII violation under § 704(a). 250 Burlington
Northern argued that since White's suspension without pay was later
rectified by her reinstatement with past due wages, White ultimately
suffered no adverse employment action; she got her job and her money
244. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 149 (discussing the need of an official company act in
order to establish a tangible employment action).
245. Id. at 149-50.
246. Id. at 152.
247. White 1, 364 F.3d at 802 (quoting Mattei v. Mattei, 126 F.3d 794, 805 (6th Cir.
1997)) (emphasis added)). The Mattei court discussed retaliation provisions in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1140 (1974), and the
National Labor Relations Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1974). See Mattei, 126 F.3d at
800 (interpreting the concept of an "employment relationship").
248. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 364 F.3d 789, 789 (6th
Cir. 2004), Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White I), 126 S.Ct. 2405
(2006). The Government endorsed the materiality standard in its amicus brief to the
Supreme Court (Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Respondent,
2006 WL 622123 (U.S)).
249. Brief for the United States, supra note 248, as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
Respondent, 2006 WL 622123 (U.S), at 23, quoting Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127,
1130-1131 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
250. White 1, 364 F.3d at 800; see supra Part II.B for discussion of the ultimate
employment decision.
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back.251 Burlington Northern's argument primarily relied on the Sixth
Circuit case of Dobbs- Weinstein v. Vanderbilt University,252 in which a
university that had denied tenure to a professor later reversed its
decision. 253 The Dobbs- Weinstein court held that the denial, followed by
the grant of tenure failed to constitute an adverse employment decision
since any adverse effect was rectified.254 It was the "reversal [that] was
the ultimate employment decision. 255 The Sixth Circuit distinguished
the current action from Dobbs-Weinstein and stated that Dobbs-
Weinstein did not control, explaining that its holding in the latter case
256rested on the peculiar nature of tenured university positions.
In clarification of its decision in White, the Sixth Circuit announced
that it would join the majority of the circuits in refusing to impose an
"ultimate employment decision" standard, as Burlington Northern would
require.257 In support of its argument, the court cited Lovejoy- Wilson v.
NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc.,258 in which the Second Circuit held that an
employee's suspension, which was later reversed, constituted an adverse
employment action, despite the employer's payment of backwages.259
Lovejoy-Wilson addressed discrimination in the context of an Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 260 claim, and held that the employee (who
suffered from epilepsy) established a prima facie case of retaliation by
showing that, among other actions, the employer suspended the
employee without pay for seven days after she filed ADA charges.26'
Similar in language to Title VII, the ADA prohibits employers "from
discriminating against any individual because such individual has
opposed any act or practices made unlawful by this chapter or because
such individual made a charge, assisted or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter., 262 The court
251. White I, 364 F.3d at 800.
252. Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).
253. Id. at 543-44.
254. Id.
255. White I, 364 F.3d at 801 (quoting Dobbs-Weinstein, 185 F.3d at 545).
256. Id. at 802 n.7. Whether the court's distinction signaled a genuine change in the
court's analysis of adverse employment actions, or whether it was merely, as the court
stated, a distinction between the two fact patterns, is questionable. A concurring opinion
stated that the decision in White certainly overturned Dobbs-Weinstein. Id. at 808 (Clay,_
J., concurring).
257. White 1, 364 F.3d at 802; see supra Part II.B for discussion.
258. Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2001).
259. Lovejoy-Wilson, 263 F.3d at 223.
260. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-213 (1990).
261. Love-Joy Wilson, 263 F.3d at 223.
262. 42 U.S.C. § 12101-213. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: "It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees or applicants for employment ... because he has opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
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stated that, in the present case, even if the backpay was reinstated, the
employee suffered the loss of the wages during the suspension,263 and the
damage had already been done.264 By way of contrast, the Sixth Circuit
mentioned that in its prior decision, Jackson v. City of Columbus,26 5 a
suspension with pay and benefits did not constitute an adverse
employment action.
266
The Sixth Circuit's treatment of the issue rested on five points.
First, the statute's plain language did not require an ultimate employment
decision before an action is considered to violate Title V11. 267 Second,
the suspension in White's case was not trivial, even if it did not result in
a termination, i.e., an ultimate employment decision; the suspension did
not fall into the category of "mere inconvenience(s)" that fail to warrant
Title VII protection. 268  The suspension would have resulted in a
termination if White did not challenge it, and during the time of the
suspension she received no pay.269 Third, if the employer's actions were
not a violation of Title VII, then White would be unable to pursue her
claim under Title VII, which provides not only compensatory relief (such
as backpay), but also includes the recovery of attorney's fees and
additional awards such as damages for emotional suffering.270 The court
discussed a fourth reason for its departure from the ultimate employment
decision standard: White complained about the allegedly discriminatory
conduct both through internal procedures as well as through the courts.
271
The fact that she pursued her complaint through both avenues of redress
should not foreclose her options and render the issue moot before the
courts until the employer reached its ultimate decision. 2/2
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
263. Love-Joy Wilson, 263 F.3d at 224.
264. The Lovejoy-Wilson court also stated, "that lesser actions may be considered
adverse employment actions ... [such as] 'negative evaluation letters, [and] express
accusations of lying... . Id. at 223 (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d
Cir. 1999)).
265. Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 1999).
266. Id. at 752.
267. White I, 364 F.3d at 802. Title VII does not include the "ultimate employment
decision" language and does not, on its face, require such a finding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a) (2000).
268. White 1, 364 F.3d at 802.
269. Id. at 793.
270. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. 198 1a(b); 2000e-5 (g), (k) (1991); Albermarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (the purposes of Title VII include making the
plaintiff whole for injuries caused by employment discrimination).
271. White ,364 F.3d at 793.
272. Id.
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Lastly, the court pointed to the two circuits whose decisions
arguably endorsed the ultimate employment decision standard:273 the
Fifth Circuit 274 and the Eighth Circuit. 275  Neither of these circuits
appeared to hold to that standard in all events. The Sixth Circuit noted
that the Fifth Circuit recognized the need to perhaps revisit the issue in
light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Ellerth.2 76 Furthermore, according
to the Sixth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit had regularly taken a more
expansive approach to the issue, citing, e.g., Manning v. Metro Life Ins.
Co.,277 which held that an ultimate employment decision includes
"tangible changes in duties or work conditions that constituted a material
employment disadvantage. 78  The court also cited the Eighth Circuit
case of Kim v. Nash Finch Co.,279 in which an employee who was not
"discharged, demoted, or suspended,, 280 may be subject to an ultimate
employment decision when he or she endures a "reduction in duties,
actions that disadvantage or interfere with the employee's ability to do
his or her job, [or] 'papering' of an employee's file with negative reports
and reprimands.,, 281 Regardless of the Eighth Circuit's labeling of its list
273. Id at 801.
274. See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997).
275. See, e.g., Ledergerber v. Strangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997).
276. White I, 364 F.3d at 801; Fierros v. Tex. Dep't of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 192-93,
192 n.2, (5th Cir. 2001).
277. Manning v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 127 F3d 686 (8th Cir. 1997).
278. Id. at 692.
279. Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 127 F.3d 1046, 1060 (8th Cir. 1997).
280. White 1, 364 F.3d at 801.
281. Id. In reference to this analysis, the court also mentioned two prior cases in a
footnote. Id. at 799, n.5 (discussing Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc 'Y, 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir.
1991) and EEOC v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ohio
1999)). In Passer, the employer canceled a symposium in honor of a former employee
after that employee's allegation of employment discrimination. Passer, 935 F.2d at 330-
31. The District of Columbia Circuit Court held that the cancellation might be
considered retaliatory for purposes of Title VII, despite the fact that the employee had
ceased to work for the employer. Id. As noted by the D.C. Circuit in Passer, the
Supreme Court had previously dealt with whether a former employee may bring an action
for discrimination under § 704(a) in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. 519 U.S. 337, 339 (1999).
If former employees were excluded, this "would undermine the effectiveness of Title VII
by allowing the threat of postemployment retaliation to deter victims of discrimination
from complaining to the EEOC." Id. at 346.
The second case, Outback Steakhouse, concerned an employee whose employer
counterclaimed in reaction to a lawsuit alleging discrimination. Outback Steakhouse, 75
F. Supp. 2d at 757. The counterclaim, held the Ohio district court, was sufficient to
constitute retaliation, regardless of its direct effect on employment. Id. at 758-60. The
Ohio court said that, "The impetus behind Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is the need
to prevent employers from deterring victims of discrimination from complaining to the
EEOC." Id. at 758. The Sixth Circuit noted "that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is
not limited to discrimination affecting employment." White 1, 364 F.3d at 799 (citing
Outback Steakhouse, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 758-60). In dicta, the Sixth Circuit stated that it
was unnecessary in White's case to distill the fine distinctions between, on the one hand,
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as examples of ultimate employment decisions, arguably some of the
actions, such as papering, would not qualify as ultimate employment
decisions.
2. The Reassignment
In a scant, single paragraph, the Sixth Circuit dealt with whether the
plaintiffs job transfer was an adverse employment action.282  Given
White's fellow workers' opinion that the new job was harder, the fact
that the new position required fewer qualifications, such qualifications
being "an indication of prestige, ' 283 and Burlington Northern's admission
that the forklift operator position was not only better, but the male
workers resented a female for having it, the court held that the
reassignment was a demotion "evidenced by 'indices ... unique to [the]
particular situation," 284 and was an adverse employment action.285 Since
the court defined any materially adverse employment action to sound in
breach of both § 703(a) and § 704(a),286 it was unnecessary for the court
to distinguish two theories of liability under the respective sections.
287
actions that materially affect employment and, on the other, actions that are retaliatory
and materially adverse, but that nonetheless do not affect employment; in White's case,
both the suspension and job transfer clearly did affect employment. Id. at 799. From the
court's language, it appears, however, that the court would have been willing to consider
claims such as those made in Passer and Outback Steakhouse as constituting adverse
employment actions. "The D.C. Circuit and the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio have written well-reasoned opinions that conclude that.., an
employer is prohibited from retaliating in materially adverse ways, regardless of whether
the retaliatory acts affect employment." Id. at 799 n.5.
282. White I, 364 F.3d at 803.
283. Id. "[T]he plaintiff had failed to show an adverse employment action, because,
among other things, her job reassignment did not entail any loss of prestige." Id. (citing
Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1996)).
284. Id. (citing Kocsis, 97 F.3d at 886).
285. Whitel, 364 F.3d at 803.
286. It bears repeating that the Sixth Circuit limited its decision on appeal to whether
the employee suffered a retaliation, not whether the employer was guilty of substantive
discrimination. Id. at 791.
287. The Sixth Circuit established that the suspension and the transfer were both acts
of retaliation. Id. at 803. In reference to the court's decision regarding pretext, attorney's
fees and punitive damages, the court first addressed Burlington Northern's reasons for the
actions which Burlington Northern argued in the alternative should the court hold that the
actions were adverse employment actions. Id. at 804. The Sixth Circuit held that the
reasons were pretextual. Id. at 804. The court's decision rested, first, on Burlington
Northern's inconsistent testimony regarding its justification and, second, the jury's ability
to believe White's, rather than Burlington Northern's, recitation of the events. Id.
The Sixth Circuit then concluded its opinion by holding that White was entitled to
attorney fees, id. at 805, and that she may also be entitled to punitive damages. Id. at
808. On remand, the court noted, only the issue of punitive damages should be
addressed. Id.
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C. The Next Step
White successfully argued that Burlington Northern retaliated
against her when it transferred and suspended her in response to
complaints she made concerning employment discrimination.28 8
Burlington Northern petitioned the Supreme Court for an appeal of the
case, and the Court granted cert.2 89 The Court could have refused to
grant the appeal, in which case the circuit split would have continued.
Or, the Court could have granted cert. and merely adopted the standard
employed by the Sixth Circuit, which would have resolved the lower
courts' disarray. The Court, however, chose a third way, creating a
standard that differed from the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of Title VII.
IV. The Supreme Court Decision
A. The Opinion of the Court
The Supreme Court unanimously held, with one concurrence by
Justice Alito,290 that Burlington Northern engaged in retaliation both
when it reassigned White and when it suspended her.291 In reaching its
decision, the Court rejected the EEOC standard (contained in the EEOC
Guidelines),2 92 the standard proffered by the Government,29 3 the standard
offered by the petitioner (Burlington Northern),2 94 as well as the standard
argued by the respondent (White).29 5 Instead, the Court adopted the
standard used by the Seventh Circuit296 and District of Columbia
Circuit 297 Courts, which provides that "a plaintiff must show that a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially
adverse, 'which in this context means it might well have dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.' ' 298 The Court recognized that employment relatedness
288. Id.
289. White L 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, Burlington N. & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 797 (2005) (No. 05-259).
290. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White I1), 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2418
(2006); see also discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing Justice Alito's concurrence).
291. Id. at 2416.
292. Id. at 2413; EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, "Retaliation," 8008 at 6512 (July
31, 1998).
293. White I 126 S. Ct. at 2414.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 2410.
296. Washington v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005).
297. Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
298. White II, 126 S. Ct. at 2410-11 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211,
1219 (citing Washington, 420 F.3d at 662 (quotations omitted))).
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and materiality were the paramount issues dividing the circuit courts.29 9
The Court's resolution of the split "requires us to decide whether Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision forbids only those employer actions and
resulting harms that are related to employment and the workplace. And
we must characterize how harmful an act of retaliatory discrimination
must be in order to fall within the provision's scope.,
300
The Court repeated the substantive discrimination and anti-
retaliation provisions of §§ 703(a) and 704(a) of Title VII, and stated that
while the statute forbids retaliation, the split in the circuit courts
concerned whether or not the same standard applied for discriminatory
acts under both sections, particularly whether or not the employer's
conduct must be employment related and how harmful the employer's
actions must be. 30  The Court then parsed the four different standards
used by the circuits.30 2
First, courts in the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits had used a
uniform standard for discriminatory acts that violate either the
substantive provision of § 703(a), or the retaliation provision of
§ 704(a).30 3 These circuits hold all discriminatory acts, whether sounding
in § 703(a) or § 704(a), as imposing the same standard, i.e., that the
employer's actions must "resul[t] in an adverse effect on the 'terms,
conditions, or benefits' of employment., 30 4  For purposes of an
application of § 704(a), these circuits required not only that the
retaliatory acts be employment related, but also that the acts be
materially adverse.30 5
Second, the Court noted that a stricter standard had been adopted by
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits by requiring that only those actions that
constitute an ultimate employment decision violate the retaliatory
provision of Title VII. 30 6 Third, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit
followed the EEOC standard, announced in its 1998 Guidelines, 307 which




302. Id. at 2410-11.
303. 126 S. Ct. at 2410; Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir.
1997) (discussed supra Part II.); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir.
2001) (discussed supra Part II.A.2); White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364
F.3d 789, 799 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussed supra Part.III).
304. White 11, 126 S.Ct. at 2410 (quoting Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866).
305. Id.
306. Id.; Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussed
supra Part II.B.I); Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997)
(discussed supra Part II.B.2).
307. White I, 126 S.Ct. at 2411; EEOC Compliance Manual § 8, "Retaliation,"
8008 at 6512 (July 31, 1998).
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likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected
activity. '3°8 The standard does not require employment relatedness, nor
does the standard explicitly deal with the notion of material adversity.
In their own ways, the approach of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, on
the one hand, and the approach of the Ninth Circuit on the other, both
require different standards to establish a violation of § 703(a) or
§ 704(a), although each falls on opposite ends of the spectrum of
actionable conduct. For the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, employment
relatedness was required for a successful plaintiff to establish retaliation,
and employment relatedness under § 704(a) was not merely a term,
condition or privilege of employment, as specified under § 703(a), but
instead, for the Fifth30 9 and Eighth31 0 Circuits, was an ultimate
employment decision, such as a termination.31 The Ninth31 2 Circuit
would not require job relatedness at all to establish retaliation under
§ 704(a) 13 (and the statute, on its face, does not impose such a
requirement 3 14), nor would it require materiality, even if § 703(a) 315 does
specify that a violation must concern a term, condition or privilege of
employment.3 16
The Court chose the fourth way, using the interpretation of the
standard used by the Seventh and the D.C. Circuits3 17 in cases of
retaliation.318  The Supreme Court's standard does not require
employment relatedness, but it does to some degree parallel the case as it
was analyzed by the Sixth Circuit, especially the Sixth Circuit's
treatment of materiality. 319 "The employer's challenged action would
have been material to a reasonable employee ... [and] dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
308. White II, 126 S. Ct. at 2411 (quoting Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43
(9th Cir. 2000)) (discussed supra Part II.C).
309. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
310. Manning, 127 F.3d at 692.
311. White I, 126 S. Ct. at2410.
312. Henderson, 217 F.3d at 1242-43.
313. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(2000).
314. Id.
315. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1998).
316. White I, 126 S. Ct. at2411.
317. Wash. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661-62 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussed
supra Part II.D.1); Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussed
supra Part II.D.2).
318. White II, 126 S. Ct. at 2414-15.
319. See, e.g., White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 364 F.3d 789,
795 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 797 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2005) (No. 05-259)
(discussing the Sixth Circuit's analysis of adverse employment actions).
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discrimination., 320 The Court eliminated job relatedness, as the Sixth
Circuit would require, but maintained the need to establish materiality,
which was in accordance with the Sixth Circuit ruling.3 2'
The Court compared the language used in sections 703(a) and
704(a):
§ 703(a) of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for the employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
sex, or national origin.
322
§ 704(a) of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment.., because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
323
Noting that the wording differed in the two sections, the court stated
that § 703(a) focuses on who the employee is, that is, the employee's
protected status,324 while § 704(a) concerns what the employee does, that
320. White II, 126 S. Ct. at 2411 (quoting IlL. Dep 't of Revenue, 420 F.3d at 662)
(discussed supra Part I.D. 1).
321. Id. at 2416.
322. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1998).
323. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(2000). Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White 11), 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2411
(2006).
324. 42 U.S.C.. § 2000e-2(a).
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is, asserting his or her rights;325 the different statutory goals addressed in
each section confront different evils.3 26 In order to achieve the goals of
Title VII, both sections prohibit discrimination, but each section attempts
to curtail different employer actions and necessitate different standards
of actionable discriminatory conduct. Section 703(a) attacks substantive
employment discrimination, whereas § 704(a) attacks acts that may not
be employment related, but would, if not prohibited, constitute
discrimination by interfering with employees' Title VII protections.32 7
"Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of
employees who are willing to file complaints and act as witnesses.
'Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be expected if employees
felt free to approach officials with their grievances.'",
328
In support of its argument, the Supreme Court in White 329 cited
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc. 330 Mitchell addressed
retaliation under a different statute, 29 U.S.C § 158 of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"). 33' The Court recognized that imposing
different standards under §§ 703(a) and 704(a) had parallels in the
NLRA.3 32  Section 158(a)(3) of title 29 of the U.S.C. prohibits
substantive discrimination against workers for their membership activity
related to labor organizations,3 33 and 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) prohibits the
employer from retaliating against a worker who asserts his or her rights
under the NLRA.334 Precedent for the unique nature of retaliation was
established, therefore, by the Court's rulings involving other statutory
schemes, including the NLRA.33 5
325. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
326. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White II), 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2411-13
(2006).
327. Id. at 2412; see also, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341-346 (1997)
(discussing the meaning of an employee under section 704(a)). Robinson holds that a
former employee may bring actions for retaliation, despite the fact that he or she no
longer works for the employer. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346. Actions taken against former
employees, by definition, cannot be employment related. For a review of retaliatory
conduct, see Scott Rosenberg & Jeffrey Lipman, Developing a Consistent Standard for
Evaluating a Retaliation Case under Federal & State Civil Rights Statutes & State
Common Law Claims: An Iowa Model for the Nation, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 359, 362 (2005).
328. White II, 126 S. Ct. at 2414 (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,
361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960)).
329. Id.
330. Mitchell, 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
331. Id; National Labor Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1974).
332. White II, 126 S. Ct. at 2414.
333. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
334. Id.
335. The Supreme Court also stated that the NLRA anti-retaliation provision attacked
"a wide variety of employer conduct." See White II, 126 S.Ct. at 2414 (quoting Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 461 U.S. 731, 740 (1983)).
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Regarding Ellerth and its subsequent clarifications, in which
tangible employment actions were addressed, the Supreme Court stated
that such cases only dealt with whether or not an employer could assert
an affirmative defense to charges of employment discrimination.336
Ellerth and its progeny did not address Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision.3 37  The Government's and Burlington Northern's
understanding of Ellerth mischaracterized § 704(a) as mandating a
tangible employment action, and the Court rejected this interpretation.338
The Court also rejected the EEOC's standard, which required neither job
relatedness nor materiality.
339
The Court explained its adopted standard, particularly the
requirement that the action be materially adverse: 340  "We speak of
material adversity because we believe it is important to separate
significant from trivial harm... petty slights, minor annoyances and
simple lack of good manners ... [are unlikely] 'to deter victims of
discrimination from complaining to the EEOC']. 341  Furthermore, the
Court chose to announce a standard in which the context of the
employer's actions was important to determining whether one could
assert that the actions were material. 342  "Context matters. 'The real
social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not
fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical
acts performed.' 343 The Sixth Circuit similarly had acknowledged the
importance of context in determinations of materiality when it stated that
courts must consider "'indices that might be unique to a particular
situation.' 344 The materiality standard preserves the twin notions of,
first, weeding out those claims that concern employment actions that are
merely irritating, annoying or downright rude (but are not statutorily
prohibited), and, second, encouraging truly harmed employees to be
336. Id. at 2413.
337. Id.; see also Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004)
(discussing Ellerth but failing to address the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII).
338. White I, 126 S.Ct. at 2413.
339. Id.; see also Howard Zimmerle, Note, Common Sense v. The EEOC: Co-worker
Ostracism and Shunning as Retaliation Under Title VII, 30 IOWA J. CORP. L. 627, 634
(2005) (discussing the broad view the EEOC has taken in regards to the anti-retaliation
provision).
340. White I, 126 S.Ct. at 2415.
341. Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner, Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S 75, 80
(1998)) (emphasis in original).
342. Id.
343. Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81-82.
344. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 364 F.3d 789, 797 (6th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 797 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2005) (No. 05-259) (quoting Kocsis
v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996)).
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protected.34 5
The potential impreciseness of the term "material" was made clear
during oral arguments before the Supreme Court, when Justice Alito
asked Respondent's counsel, Donald Donati, representing White,
"[W]hat does material mean? '346  Donati replied, "That's a great
question .. ." in reaction to which the courtroom erupted in laughter.
347
Justice Souter asked, "[D]o you think [it] does anything more than just
eliminate clearly de minimus behavior on the part of the employer?"
348
Donati answered, "I don't think it does anything other than that. 34 9
Respondent's counsel went on to say (referring specifically to White's
reassignment), that the injury to White, caused by the actions of her
employer, was material and clearly a "substantial injury.5
350
Stating that whether an employer's actions are considered material
requires a case by case analysis, the Court applied this standard to the
retaliatory actions alleged by White, holding that Burlington Northern
violated § 704(a) in the case of the transfer and of the suspension.
35 1
Regarding White's transfer, the Court agreed with White that even if the
reassignment to the new position fell within White's job classification,
Burlington Northern's actions were nonetheless retaliatory.352 The Court
acknowledged that while the reassignment was technically consistent
with the scheme of job descriptions used by Burlington Northern, the
new position was "'more arduous and dirtier,"' than her former position
as forklift operator, which required more qualifications and was
objectively considered a better job by the male employees who resented
White for having such a "prestigious" position.35 3  The differences
between the two work positions led the Court to conclude that Burlington
Northern was trying to avoid liability under Title VII by attempting to
technically comply with the law while violating the statute's clear
345. White I, 126 S.Ct. at 2416.
346. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49. White I, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006) (No. 05-
259), 2006 WL 1063292.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 49-50.
350. Id. at 50. As the Sixth Circuit stated in the case below, "[t]aking away an
employee's paycheck for over a month is not trivial, and if motivated by discriminatory
intent, it violates Title VII." White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 364
F.3d 789, 802 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 797 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2005) (No. 05-
259).
351. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White I1), 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2416
(2006).
352. Id. at2416-17.
353. Id. at 2417; see also Christine Bradshaw, Note, A Revised Tangible Employment
Action Analysis: Just What Is an Undesirable Reassignment?, 14 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 385 (2006) (criticizing courts' present interpretation of "undesirable
reassignment," and describing it as a departure from U.S. Supreme Court precedent).
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intention to prevent retaliation.35a
Almost every job category involves some responsibilities and duties
that are less desirable than others. Common sense suggests that one
good way to discourage an employee such as White from bringing
discrimination charges would be to insist that she spend more time
performing the more arduous duties and less time performing those
that are easier or more agreeable. That is presumably why the EEOC
has consistently found "[rietaliatory work assignments" to be a
classic and "widely recognized" example of "forbidden
retaliation."
' 355
Burlington Northern argued in its brief to the Supreme Court that,
since both positions fell within the same job classification, the transfer
could be neither adverse nor a demotion. 356 The Respondent, White,
noted in her brief that if job classification was the sole criteria for
deciding whether a reassignment was adverse, the employer would have
an incentive to classify jobs as broadly as possible, ensuring that a
transfer remained within a job classification so the employer could not be
held to having acted adversely to the extent the reassignment was merely
within the classification.357 Alternatively, the employer could create job
classifications that included both better and less desirable positions, in
which case the employer would be invulnerable if a transfer to the poorer
position was claimed to be adverse. The Court agreed with White that
the reassignment was material and, therefore, retaliatory. 3 s
The Court also found White's thirty-seven-day suspension to be
retaliatory, despite Burlington Northern's insistence that it had rectified
the suspension by giving White backpay. 359 First, the Court's ruling on
the suspension encompassed that Title VII allowed a successful plaintiff
to potentially receive punitive as well as compensatory damages.360
Since Congress had amended Title VII in 1991 to allow recovery of these
damages, holding otherwise would prevent White from obtaining the
benefit of Congress's clear intent.361 In support of this conclusion, the
Court also pointed to the availability of injunctive relief in Title VII
cases, which would be unavailable to the extent Burlington Northern's
354. White II, 126 S.Ct. at 2416-17.
355. Id. at 2416 (quoting 2 EEOC 1991 Manual § 614.7, pp. 614-31 to 614-32).
356. Brief for Petitioner at 27-29, White II, 126 S.Ct. 2405, No. 05-259 (U.S. Jan. 26,
2006), 2006 WL 704480.
357. Brief for Respondent at 32, White II, 126 S.Ct. 2405, No. 05-259 (U.S. March 9,
2006), 2006 WL 622126.
358. See id.; see also White l, 126 S.Ct. at 2417.
359. White ll, 126 S.Ct. at2417-18.
360. Id. at 2417.
361. Id.
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actions failed to pose a violation of Title VII.
3 62
Second, the Court noted that White suffered from the lack of pay at
the time of the suspension, regardless of whether she ultimately was
recompensed.3 63 A reasonable employee observing White's treatment by
Burlington Northern could have been dissuaded from asserting his or her
statutory rights. As the Court stated, the suspension would have led to
White's termination, if not challenged by White, and "an indefinite
suspension without pay could well act as a deterrent, even if the
suspended employee eventually received backpay. ... Thus, the jury's
conclusion that the 37-day suspension without pay was materially
adverse was a reasonable one. 364
The Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit reached the same
conclusion in favor of White, but for different, albeit somewhat similar,
reasons. The Court pointed out that while the Sixth Circuit correctly
required that the employer's actions must be material, there was no need
to show that the actions were employment-related.365 In White's case,
the employer's actions were clearly employment-related, posing a
change in the conditions of her employment through a transfer and
suspension without pay.366 The Court clarified retaliation, however, by
noting that employers may take actions that, while retaliatory, occur
either outside the workplace or are not tangible employment actions, and
still threaten Title VII, inflicting harms on employees who would
otherwise have no redress.
367
B. Justice A lito's Concurrence
Justice Alito agreed with the result but questioned the standard used
by the Court.368 Justice Alito would require that the employer's actions
were both material and employment-related in order for a § 704(a) claim
to be actionable, thus offering a uniform standard for violations of either
362. Id.
363. Id. The Court included White's testimony at trial in which she stated, "That was
the worst Christmas I had out of my life. No income, no money, and that made us all feel
bad.... I got very depressed." White II, 126 S.Ct. at 2417.
364. Whitel, 126 S.Ct. at 2417-18.
365. Id. at 2414-15.
366. Id. at 2416.
367. The unfairness of this result, if applied in Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211
(D.C. Cir. 2006), (discussed supra Part II.D.2 ), in which the plaintiffs family was
threatened, not by the employer, but by persons outside the workplace, may have been on
the minds of the justices in reaching their result; the inaction of the employer in Rochon
was material, even if it was not employment related. Id. at 1218. See also Robinson v.
City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3rd Cir. 2004) discussed supra Part II.D.2
(actions taken by an employer against a former employee may still constitute retaliation).
368. White II, 126 S.Ct. at 2418-22..
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§ 703(a) or § 704(a).3 69  Since the suspension and reassignment were
material and employment-related, Justice Alito would hold that
Burlington Northern violated § 704(a), and he concurred in the Court's
finding for White.37°
Justice Alito specifically discussed the Rochon decision, and stated
that under his uniform standard, even if the worker was precluded from
filing a § 704(a) claim, a § 703(a) claim would still have been
available.371 Justice Alito's conclusions in this regard failed to address
the possibility that an employee may not have a substantive
discrimination claim, but could arguably maintain a claim for retaliation
despite a lack of employment-relatedness.372
Justice Alito's difficulty with the Court's standards for §§ 703(a)
and 704(a) extended to the Court's holding that actionable retaliation
pertains to conduct that could dissuade a reasonable employee from
asserting his or her rights under Title VII. 373 A court's perception of the
reasonable employee may be obscured, in Justice Alito's view, if
369. Id. at 2420. See also the standards in the Third Circuit, discussed infra Part
II.A.1, the Fourth Circuit, discussed infra Part II.A.2, and the Sixth Circuit, discussed
infra Part III.
370. White II, 126 S.Ct. at 2421-22.
371. Id. at 2420.
372. Two Supreme Court cases examine the notion that §§ 703(a) and 704(a) claims
are distinct, depending on the party who files the claim and the actions of the employer.
The Supreme Court held in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
that, even if a claim of retaliation fails, the claim of discrimination may be successful.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 799. The Court, in Jackson v. Birmingham Bd.
of Educ., 125 S.Ct. 1497 (2005) held that a retaliation claim may succeed even when a
discrimination claim is unsuccessful. Jackson, 125 S.Ct. at 1510. Losing on the claim of
discrimination, but winning on the claim of retaliation, as occurred in White II, highlights
the two Title VII protections provided under §§ 703(a) and 704(a). An employee who
alleges discrimination may not be able to establish a case as required under § 703(a). The
employee may prove retaliation was taken, however, when the employee pursues his or
her right to a discrimination-free workplace, if the employer took action against the
employee for asserting such rights. The two theories of liability are severable, and an
employee who never claims discrimination in violation of § 703(a) may sue under
§ 704(a).
For example, Ken supervises three workers, Keisha, Paolo and Chris. Paolo
overhears Ken's threat to fire Keisha if Keisha does not agree to date him. Paolo
complains to his employer about Ken's conduct, and, as a result of his complaints, Paolo
is fired. Paolo may claim retaliation in violation of Title VII, even though he was not the
object of the original discriminatory conduct. In proving retaliation, Paolo may point not
only to the act of dismissal, but he may also show that his fellow worker, Chris, or any
other employee, could be dissuaded from complaining about the discrimination, since the
result of Paolo's complaint was termination. It is, therefore, compatible with the
protections established by Title VII that the complaints of discrimination and retaliation
may be resolved differently, or not argued in tandem, depending on which party files suit
and his or her respective theory of employer liability. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d
1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussed supra Part IC).
373. White II, 126 S.Ct. at 2421.
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materiality can only be determined in the context of the employer's
conduct. 374 "[T]he majority's test is not whether an act of retaliation well
might dissuade the average reasonable worker, putting aside all
individual characteristics, but, rather, whether the act well might
dissuade the reasonable worker who shares at least some individual
characteristics with the actual victim. ' '375  Justice Alito's reservations
raised an issue that is similar to concerns in the Court's prior decision in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
376
Harris dealt with a hostile work environment claim under Title
VII. 377 The worker, Teresa Harris, alleged that her employer created an
abusive environment in which the company president used offensive
language, made sexual innuendos and generally engaged in improper
conduct and gender bias. 378 Harris quit her job and sued.379 Harris was
unsuccessful at trial and in the Sixth Circuit.380  On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the Court held that the lower courts had applied an
incorrect standard for discriminatory conduct.
38'
Harris resolved a split in the circuits regarding the standard to be
applied to employer conduct in cases alleging a violation of § 703(a) for
purposes of a hostile work environment. 38' The Court stated that its prior
cases established that prohibited conduct,
is not limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination. The phrase
"terms, conditions or privileges of employment" evinces a
Congressional intent to "strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women" in employment.... [W]hen the
workplace is permeated with "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult" that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
environment, Title VII is violated (some internal quotation marks
omitted)."
383
The question of how abusive, i.e., how material the conduct must
be, weighed on the Court's mind in reaching its decision in Harris.
Harris quoted Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, saying that while "'mere
utterance of an epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
377. Id. at 19.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 19-20.
381. Id. at 21.
382. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
383. Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (1978) and Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
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employee' ... does not sufficiently affront the conditions of employment
to implicate Title VII ... [a]n environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive" would still violate Title VII.384  The
Harris Court also recognized that the employee's perception is important
in determining whether the conduct was harmful. "[I]f the victim does
not specifically perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has
not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there
is no Title VII violation." '385 While the Harris Court noted that the
standard requires a case-by-case analysis of the conduct, rather than a
bright-line test, to determine if the employer's actions were sufficiently
material, "we can say that whether an environment is 'hostile' or
'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances....
No single factor is required.
3 86
If Harris and Burlington Northern each force the courts to analyze
materiality, and thereby, reasonableness, on a case-by-case basis, Justice
Alito would consider this particularized analysis unnecessarily
burdensome.387 In Justice Alito's view, requiring that the employer's
384. Id. at 21.
385. Id. at 21-22.
386. Id. at 22.
387. Harris does not reference the phrase "the reasonable woman" in its holding,
using instead "the reasonable person." Id. at 21. However, the need to determine
materiality in reference to the reasonableness of the victim raised the issue of what is
considered reasonable to a particular worker. The Ninth Circuit previously employed the
phrase in Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), which held "that a female
plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile-environment sexual harassment when she
alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment." Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (footnote omitted). The Court's ruling in Harris,
when read, for example, in connection with its ruling in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.,523 U.S. 75 (1998), stands for the proposition that women and men may
bring cases claiming violations of Title VII, and the view of the reasonable person in this
regard will be used by the court. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. See, for
example, the following reviews for a discussion of the reasonable woman standard:
David I. Gedrose, Workplace Sexual Harassment: The Ninth Circuit's Reasonable
Woman Standard and Employer Remedial Actions in Hostile Environment Claims
Following Ellison v. Brady, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 151 (1991); Angela Baker, The
"Reasonable Woman" Standard Under Ellison v. Brady: Implications for Assessing the
Severity of Sexual Harassment and the Adequacy of Employer Response, 17 J. CORP. L.
691 (1992); Kathleen Nordin, Ellison v. Brady: Is the Reasonable Woman Test the
Solution to the Problem of How Best to Evaluate Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment Claims?, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 607 (1992); Robert S. Adler & Ellen R.
Peirce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the "Reasonable Woman"
Standard in Sexual Harassment Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773 (1993); Melanie A.
Meads, Applying the Reasonable Woman Standard in Evaluating Sexual Harassment
Claims: Is It Justified?, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 209, 221 (1993); Liesa L. Bernardin,
Note, Does the Reasonable Woman Exist and Does She Have Any Place in Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII After Harris, 46 FLA. L. REV.
291 (1994); Richard L. Wiener et al., Social Analytic Investigation of Hostile Work
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actions be employment-related under either § 703(a) or § 704(a)
eliminates the need for a court to decide whether a retaliatory action was
material to a particular employee; actions are, or are not, employment-
related, and, if they are employment-related, the actions are necessarily
material.3 88  Justice Alito's evaluation of the issue and his preferred
standard may be more clear-cut relative to the Court's decision, but it is
not necessarily more fair. In any case, the Supreme Court in Burlington
Northern held that to ensure Title VII's protections, employment
relatedness is not required under § 704(a).
V. The Supreme Court's Analysis of Tangible Employment Actions:
Ellerth and Its Progeny
The Supreme Court established that §§ 703(a) and 704(a) are
distinct, addressing different discriminatory conduct. 389  While
employment relatedness is required for purposes of successfully arguing
the claim of substantive discrimination, retaliatory acts must be material,
but are not necessarily related to employment. 390  The Court had
identified employment relatedness as a requirement in a series of
discrimination cases that did not deal with retaliation, but did discuss the
notion of a tangible employment action.39 '
The Supreme Court last dealt with the issue of tangible employment
actions in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders.392 The classification was
important for purposes of determining whether the employer's action
would trigger the employer's opportunity for an affirmative defense
against charges of substantive employment discrimination. Suders
Environments: A Test of the Reasonable Woman Standard, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 263
(1995); Barry S. Roberts & Richard A. Mann, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A
Primer, 29 AKRON L. REV. 269 (1996); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Reasonable Woman
Standard: A Meta-Analytic Review of Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual
Harassment, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 33 (1998); Leslie M. Kerns, A Feminist
Perspective: Why Feminists Should Give the Reasonable Woman Standard Another
Chance, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 195 (2001); Elizabeth L. Shoenfelt, Allison E. Maue,
& JoAnn Nelson, Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable Woman: Does It Matter? 10
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 633 (2002); Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives on
Equality and Gender Discrimination in Employment: 1971-2002, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S
L. J. 501 (2004); Laura D. Francis, What Part of "Hostile Environment" Don't You
Understand? The Need for an Entire-Environment Approach in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 815 (2004).
388. See also the Sixth Circuit's analysis of this issue, which is discussed supra Part
III.




392. See generally Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
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clarified the Supreme Court's standard announced in Ellerth393 and
Faragher.394 The Court held in the latter cases that Title VII prohibited
discriminatory employment actions by the employer's supervisor, which
may be classified as tangible employment actions or actions that do not
rise to the level of a tangible employment action. 395 While both tangible
and intangible employment actions may be illegal under Title VII,
employers (through their supervisors) who committed actions that were
not tangible employment actions could raise an affirmative defense to
discrimination charges. 396 The affirmative defense allows an employer to
successfully challenge charges of discrimination to the extent the
employer proves that it maintained an effective anti-discrimination
policy and that the employee unreasonably failed to use it. 397  When
allowed to raise the defense, the employer is virtually assured of a win, if
the elements of the affirmative defense are successfully proven.398 In the
presence of a tangible employment action, however, the employer cannot
raise the affirmative defense, and must, for example, rely on an attack of
the plaintiffs prima facie case or, alternatively, establish a
nondiscriminatory reason for the action.3 99
In reaching its decision in Burlington Northern, two issues were
critical for the Supreme Court's resolution of the case, and both issues
were arguably related to the concept of a tangible employment action.
The first involved examining whether a particular act is a tangible
employment action and whether this determination is necessary in cases
393. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
394. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
395. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754-55; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88. The Sixth
Circuit stated that tangible employment actions and adverse employment actions were
essentially referring to the same concept. See Clarkson & Thomas, supra note 190. at
378-79. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 364 F.3d 789, 796 n.1 (6th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 797 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2005) (No. 05-259).
396. See Suders, 542 U.S. at 137-38 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 and Faragher,
524 U.S. at 807).
397. See id. at 134 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 and Faragher 524 U.S. 775). For a
discussion of why employees may not report discrimination, see Deborah L. Brake,
Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25-42 (2005).
398. For a discussion of Suders and the affirmative defense, see Megan E. Mowrey &
Virginia Ward Vaughn, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment Culminating in
Constructive Discharge: Resolving the Tangible Employment Action Question, 14
REVIEW OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES 101 (2004). For a related discussion, see
Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly Liable
for Supervisory Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on Reasonableness, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 529 (2006).
399. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see also, Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the
Meaning of Adverse Employment Action in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual
Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56
OKLA. L. REV. 623 (2003) (including a review of noneconomic or indirect injuries as a
basis for harm at 625-30).
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alleging retaliation.
400 Burlington Northern argued in the Sixth Circuit
40'
and before the Supreme Court 40 2 that the acts it took against White failed
to constitute adverse employment actions, and, therefore, it was not
guilty of retaliation. The second, companion issue concerned whether
the standard for discrimination is the same in cases alleging substantive
employment discrimination under § 703(a) and in cases alleging
retaliation in violation of § 704(a). Burlington Northern argued to the
Supreme Court that the standards were the same under both sections of
Title VII, and, therefore, it was not guilty of discrimination, again citing
the tangible employment action standard.40 3
Burlington Northern did not dispute the timing of its actions,
because timing was not at issue since Burlington Northern acted against
White after she reported her employer's substantive discrimination.4 °4
Rather, Burlington Northern argued that the acts themselves were not
adverse, i.e., tangible employment actions.40 5 If Burlington Northern's
actions were adverse, as the Sixth Circuit concluded,40 6 the timing made
them retaliatory, which Title VII prohibits.4 °7  Whether the acts
themselves subjected Burlington Northern to charges of illegal
discrimination under § 703(a) was decided in the trial court, where the
jury held that the acts did not violate § 703(a); this decision was affirmed
on appeal.40 8  Left unanswered, however, was the notion of what
constitutes retaliation under § 704(a).
At oral argument, petitioner Burlington Northern focused on the
concept that Title VII encouraged preemptive action by the employer that
both deters discrimination and prevents questionable conduct from rising
to the level of a lawsuit when such conduct is amenable to a solution
fashioned by the parties.4° 9  In this respect, Burlington Northern
attempted to draw a parallel between its actions and the notion of the
responsibility both of the employer and of the employee in rectifying
400. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White I), 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2413
(2006).
401. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White 1), 364 F.3d 789, 800 (6th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S.Ct. 797 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2005) (No. 05-259) (discussing the
suspension of White); id. at 803 (discussing the transfer of White).
402. See White I, 126 S.Ct at2411-14.
403. Id. at 2411.
404. Id. at 2416.
405. Id. at 2417.
406. See White 1, 364 F.3d at 800-04.
407. Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a) (2000).
408. See White 1, 364 F.3d at 794, 798.
409. The solution should be consistent with the employer's anti-discrimination policy
and process.
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employment discrimination as spelled out in Ellerth.41 ° Justice Scalia
questioned counsel for the Petitioner, Carter Philips, whether the
suspension was an official company act, which would make the
suspension, therefore, includable in the acts described as tangible
employment actions under the court's reasoning in Suder 41 and in
Ellerth.412 Philips acknowledged that the suspension was the act of the
company, "but the question still remains, Justice Scalia, for it to be a
tangible employment action ... is it available to the employer to cure,
when the purpose of this entire statutory scheme is to avoid litigation and
to provide informal mechanisms for protecting the rights of the
employee? ' '413 The Petitioner's argument ran that if Burlington Northern
had acted consistently with a valid anti-discrimination policy, rectifying
the suspension and paying White her backwages, then the employer
cured.41 4
Immediately after this exchange, Justice Ginsburg established one
of the key factors that decided the case. In tandem with questions from
Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg stated,
[But, the employer] didn't cure. I mean, it was 37 days, right, that
she went without pay?.. . And she understandably experienced
much stress in that time. She worried about how she would be able
to feed her children, could she get them Christmas presents. That
was-there was nothing that she got, when it was determined that she
hadn't been insubordinate, that compensated her for that stress.
4 15
Materiality, as the Court later announced, would be determined as of the
time of the suspension, rather than based on the employer's attempt to
retroactively cure.
Additionally, the claims made by the employees in Ellerth and in
Burlington Northern are distinct. Ellerth countenances cases in which an
employee who, despite access to a valid anti-discrimination policy, fails
to take advantage of that policy.416 The employee in Ellerth abdicated
her responsibility in the formula, while the employer, who attempted to
prevent discrimination through its policies, met its obligation.41 7
Burlington Northern involves something different, because it addresses
410. See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
411. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 152 (2004).
412. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24-25, White II, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006) (No. 05-
259), 2006 WL 1063292.
413. Id.
414. See White II, 126 S.Ct. at 2417.
415. Transcript of Oral Arguments at 25, White II, 126 S.Ct 2405 (2006) (No. 05-
259), 2006 WL 1063292.
416. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
417. Id.
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whether an employer can take actions specifically directed at punishing
the employee for availing himself or herself of Title VII's protections;
this is violation occurring through retaliation, and Ellerth and its progeny
418do not address retaliation. In Burlington Northern, the employee did
not abdicate responsibility for addressing employment discrimination.
Indeed, White reported the discrimination internally and was
subsequently disciplined, which was followed by EEOC charges and a
lawsuit.420 The employee in Burlington Northern was targeted for
retaliation because she used the policy and asserted her statutory
rights.42'
The Third Circuit court that heard the first appeal of Suders
422
expressed the following concern in reference to the facts in Suders. The
Third Circuit worried that an employer could make the worker's
employment so bad that the worker would be forced to quit, resulting in a
constructive discharge, and, if constructive discharge was not a tangible
employment action, the employer would be held harmless to the extent it
successfully raised the affirmative defense.423 Alternatively, according to
the Third Circuit, if constructive discharge was classified as a tangible
employment action, the employer would be prevented from raising the
affirmative defense, thereby ameliorating the court's concern.424
Nevertheless, the Suders Court held that constructive discharge would
not be classified as a tangible employment action, where, as in Suders,
the discharge involved the employee's voluntary action, and the
employer took no official action against the employee.425 Ellerth,426
Faragher427 and Suders428 all require mutual responsibility for
maintaining a discrimination-free workplace, which may begin with an
anti-discrimination policy and conclude with an employee who either
does or does not access that policy when claiming discrimination.429
Burlington Northern, however, involved actions in which a policy
was in place, as evidenced by the employee reporting allegedly
discriminatory incidents and the employer's subsequent investigations.43 °
418. See discussion supra note 338; White II, 126 S.Ct. at 2413.
419. White II, 126 S.Ct. at 2409-10.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 129 (2004).
423. Suders, 325 F.3d at 461.
424. Id.
425. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004).
426. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
427. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
428. 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004).
429. See discussion supra, notes 417-22.
430. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White I1), 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2409-10
(2006).
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The policy was, however, irrelevant to the ruling. Burlington Northern's
actions were taken because the employee took advantage of the policy,
not absent such a policy, and not despite the employee's failure to take
responsibility.
431
The goal of a discrimination-free workplace would be defeated to
the extent the employer is excused for conduct that it hopes will
discourage employees from obtaining the protections afforded by Title
VII.43' Retaliation assumes that the employer is taking action because of
the employee's attempt to address discrimination, and whether the
employment actions are classified as tangible or not, the affirmative
defense is not available. What could have been true in White's case, if
the Court had ruled otherwise, is that an employee in White's position
might be without recourse to Title VII as long as the employer's actions
occurred outside of the worker's employment 433 or, alternatively, as long
as an anti-discrimination policy was in place. Returning to the
suspension, Burlington Northern argued that the presence of its policy,
coupled with the employee's access of it, and the employer's subsequent
remedy of the suspension through backpay, rendered the employment
action nonmaterial, excusing liability. 434  But, to the contrary, the
Supreme Court held that retaliatory acts may include those acts that are
not work-related.43 5 If the Court ruled that employment relatedness was
required, the fear of the Third Circuit in Suders would have come to
pass: namely, that the employer could make conditions very bad for the
employee who alleges discrimination (whether his or her own
discrimination, or discrimination against a co-worker), and yet fear no
legal reprisal as long as the actions were not tangible employment
actions.
A ruling in favor of the employer, permitting the employer's actions
against the employee, would compromise Title VII and raise the
possibility that an employer's action that is not an ultimate employer
action might never violate § 704(a). The Court did not endorse this
431. Id.
432. Savage raised this argument when she stated that to maintain access to Title
VII's prohibitions and remediation of discrimination, any act that deters employees from
filing a charge or opposing discrimination in the workplace should constitute retaliation.
Joan M. Savage, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach to the Adverse Employment
Action Prong in a Prima Facie Case for Title VIfRetaliation, 46.B.C. L. REv 215 (2004).
433. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337, 346 (1997), in which a worker could claim retaliation even though the employer's
retaliatory actions occurred after the worker was fired.
434. White II, 126 S.Ct. at 2417-18. In regard to the reassignment, Burlington
Northern similarly claimed that the reassignment was not a tangible employment action,
since it involved a shift within a job classification rather than a tangible action such as, its
argument went, a demotion. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
435. White !, 126 S.Ct. at 2411.
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result,436 but such was the case in Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 437 in
which the Fifth Circuit required an ultimate employment action,
including, e.g., "hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and
compensating., 438 The Fifth Circuit's standard essentially repeated the
list of tangible employment actions contained in Ellerth, Faragher, and
Suders. 43 9 Nevertheless, employer actions that are discriminatory, but do
not constitute a firing, demotion, or other actions on the list of tangible
employment actions, may still violate Title VII and § 704(a);
440
retaliatory acts need not be tangible employment actions. Title VII
applies to more than economic or tangible discriminatory acts, 44 1 as
previously discussed 442 and stated by the court in Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson,443 which held that "the language of Title VII is not limited to
'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions
or privileges of employment' evidences a congressional intent 'to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in
employment. 4 44 Furthermore,
in the context of retaliation claims, employees might be deterred from
exercising their statutory rights if they knew that going forward could
result in temporary suspensions or demotions. The knowledge that
one's rights may eventually be vindicated and a position restored or a
436. Id. at 2414.
437. 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit approach is discussed supra Part
II.B. 1. See also supra, Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the Eighth Circuit which also used
the ultimate employment decision standard in Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d
686 (8th Cir. 1997).
438. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707 (quoting Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th
Cir. 198 1)).
439. Id.
440. See, e.g., Joan M. Savage, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach to the
Adverse Employment Action Prong in a Prima Facie Case for Title VII Retaliation,
46.B.C. L. REv 215, 219 (2004)., (citing Pryor v. Seyforth, Shaw, Fairweather &
Geraldson, 212 F.3d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2000); Passtino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer
Prod., Inc., 712 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000); and Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale &
Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (1981)). Each of these cases involved an unsuccessful
substantive discrimination claim and a successful claim of retaliation. Savage noted that
Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) held that, while § 703(a) of the Civil
Rights Act does not explicitly cover hostile work environments, a successful plaintiff
may nonetheless establish a violation of Title VII, despite the lack of an ultimate
employment decision. Savage, supra note 432; see also, Robert A. Kearney, The
Unintended Hostile Environment: Mapping the Limits of Sexual Harassment Law, 25
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 87 (2004).
441. Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning ofAdverse Employment Action in
Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What Should
Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REv. 623, 641-42 (2003).
442. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
443. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
444. Id. at 64 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 455 U.S.
702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
name cleared provides little solace to the employee who wishes to
avoid the stress and turmoil such temporary adverse action can
445cause.
VI. Recently Remanded Cases
Several cases, including the following two,4 4 6 have been remanded
to the circuit courts on the heels of Burlington Northern;447 both
concerned a variety of claims, including retaliation in violation of Title
VII.
In James v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville,448 the plaintiff,
James, worked for the local government as a librarian in the Nashville
Public Library system.44 9 While James had received positive work
evaluations for several years, these positive evaluations were then
followed by negative reviews for several years. 450  The employer told
James that she would be fired if her evaluations continued to be
negative.451 Efforts were made by her employer to accommodate what
James and her doctor stated were health difficulties that interfered with
her ability to comport with the employer's performance standards.452
These efforts were allegedly insufficient, and James voluntarily left her
job. James sued for violations of the Americans with Disability Act
("ADA"),453 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"),
4 54
and Title VII. 4 55  James's suits under the ADA and ADEA were
dismissed by the district court.4 56 She then proceeded under Title VII,
445. Levinson, supra 399, at 665. The notion that a discriminatory climate left
unaddressed by the employer constituted a violation of Title VII was the chief issue in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), where the employer
tolerated discriminatory conduct by its employees even after a worker complained about
the abuse. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77. A customer's discriminatory conduct has also been
attributed to the employer to the extent the employer failed to take action against the
behavior. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, 162 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998).
446. James v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 159 Fed. Appx. 686 (6th Cir. 2005); Bussell
v. Motorola, Inc., 141 Fed.Appx. 819 (11 th Cir. 2005), vacated, 127 S.Ct. 38 (2006). For
the implications for state law in, for example, Kentucky, see Stephen Richey & Faith C.
Isenhath, How Recent Kentucky Courts are Applying the Retaliation Claim in
Employment Cases, 33 N. Ky. L. Rev. 283 (2006).
447. White 11, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006).
448. 159 Fed.Appx. 686 (6th Cir. 2005).
449. Id. at 687
450. Id. at 687-88.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1995).
454. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2006).
455. Section 703(a), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(1998).
456. James v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 159 Fed.Appx. 686, 688 (6th Cir. 2005).
[Vol. 111:4
2007] ESTABLISHING RETALIATION FOR PURPOSES OF TITLE VII 941
claiming a hostile work environment and retaliation.4 7 The jury found
for James under her retaliation claim, but her employer disputed the
holding, arguing that James failed to suffer any adverse employment
action and, therefore, the verdict should be set aside and the issue
decided in favor of the defendant as a matter of law.458 The district court
denied the employer's motion, and James's appealed, seeking to reverse
the district court's other rulings.45 9
The appellate court stated that a retaliation "must be 'sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment
and create an abusive working environment.'- 460  This standard for
retaliation required proof not only that the conduct was objectively
hostile and abusive, but also that the individual targeted for the treatment
461perceived the actions as hostile and abusive. In evaluating whether or
not James met her burden of establishing an objectively hostile
environment, the court acknowledged that "indices unique to a particular
situation ' ,462 might signal a hostile work environment, but the challenged
conduct "must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an
alteration of job responsibilities. 4 63 The court did note that while an
adverse employment action must be materially adverse, retaliation may
occur even after the employee has left his or her job.46
Applying the test it had announced, the James court held that the
employer's actions failed to constitute retaliation for purposes of
violating Title VII.465 The court in this regard partially relied on its prior
Sixth Circuit opinion in Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court.466 In
Morris, the harassment included the actions of a supervisor who was
accused of "calling [the plaintiff] ... visiting her workplace to harass
her... [driving] to her office building on several occasions... sitting in
his truck looking in her office window, making faces at her.., following
her home from work... and throwing roofing nails on her home
driveway several times., 467 In contrast, James offered, in support of her
claimed retaliation, the allegation that her employer opposed James's
457. Id.
458. Id. at 688-89.
459. Id.
460. Id. at 691 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
461. Id.
462. James, 159 Fed.Appx. at 689.
463. Id. at 690 (quoting Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir.
1996)).
464. James, 159 Fed.Appx. at 690 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
339 (1997)).
465. Id.
466. 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2000).
467. James, 159 Fed. Appx. at 689 (quoting Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court,
201 F.3d 784, 793 (6th Cir. 2000)).
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filing of a disability benefit application and nothing more. 4 6 8 The James
court stated that the employer's actions were not comparable in
magnitude and did not constitute retaliation of the sort encountered in
Morris.4 69 The court remanded the case consistent with its ruling that the
plaintiff presented insufficient evidence in favor of retaliation and
granted the defendant's motion for a judgment as a matter of law.47 °
The Supreme Court subsequently remanded James to the Sixth
Circuit 471 after providing its definition of retaliation in Burlington
Northern,472 namely that "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable
employee would have found the challenged action materially
adverse.... ,,473 Job-relatedness was not required under the Supreme
Court rule.474
Bussell v. Motorola, Inc.4 7 5 similarly involved a claim of retaliation,
which the Supreme Court remanded to the Eleventh Circuit after its
decision in Burlington Northern.4 76 The district court in Bussell had
granted summary judgment to the defendant employer.477 In the facts on
appeal, the plaintiff, Bussell, claimed that she endured an allegedly
hostile work environment.478 Her employer took actions regarding the
harassment, including holding meetings that addressed the actions of the
plaintiff's co-worker, who was the center of the harassment. 479 Bussell's
supervisor then allegedly retaliated against Bussell by yelling at her and
increasing her workload.48°  While the harassing supervisor was
subsequently disciplined, Bussell claimed that she was the victim of
continuing retaliation and eventually quit.
481
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court appropriately
dismissed charges of a hostile work environment and sexual harassment,
stating that the harassment was not so "severe or pervasive to alter the
468. Id. at 691. The court also noted that, while a clerical error informed James that
she had lost family medical benefits, she did not, in fact, lose the benefits. Id. at 690.
469. Id. at 691.
470. Id.
471. James v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 127 S. Ct. 336 (2006) (remanded to the
Sixth Circuit).
472. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White (White I1), 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2416
(2006).
473. Id. at 2415.
474. Id. at 2409. This aspect of the standard was referenced by the court in James
when the James court stated that charges of retaliation may be brought against a former
employer. James, 159 Fed. App'x. at 690 n.1.
475. 141 Fed App'x. 819 (Bussel/) (11 th Cir. 2005).
476. Bussell v. Motorola, Inc.,(Bussel Il) 127 S. Ct. 38 (2006).
477. Busse 1, 141 Fed App'x. at 820.
478. Id. at 820-22.
479. Id. at 821-22.
480. Id. at 822.
481. Id.
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conditions of the employment. ,482 The court seemed to place nearly
all of its attention on whether or not Bussell provided sufficient proof
that she suffered an adverse employment action.483  The conduct
examined by the court included an incident in which the plaintiffs shirt
was pulled up and her pants were pulled down.484 The incident was
characterized by the court as a "single incident and not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the work environment., 485 In addition, the
plaintiff was subjected to ten to fifteen instances in which the same co-
worker inappropriately rubbed against her.486 The court stated that,
Unlike other cases in this Court, such as Hulsey v. Pride Res., [sic]
LLC,487 where alleged sexual activities of a supervisor occurred over
a concentrated time period, these activities occurred over a two-
month period. Bussell neither identifies, nor have we found, an
analogous holding that such alleged behavior is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to constitute a hostile workplace sexual harassment
claim.
488
The court summarily rejected Bussell's argument of retaliation for
lack of evidence supporting an adverse employment action.489  In the
court's understanding of the suit, since the plaintiff failed to suffer an
adverse employment action, and her ultimate termination was neither
involuntary nor based on cognizable harassment,49 ° the court let the prior
judgment against the plaintiff stand.49'
The court's focus on the adverse employment action claim, and its
characterization of the plaintiffs battery by her co-worker as
insufficiently severe or pervasive, allowed the court to conclude that
there could not be any retaliation.492 Such a result not only ignores the
gravity of the incidents, but also fails to address the nature of retaliation.
The Supreme Court likely sent the case back to the Eleventh Circuit for
further review consistent with these problems in the Eleventh Circuit's
analysis, not the least of which was the circuit's failure to apply the
recently announced standards for determining retaliation in violation of
Title VII under Burlington Northern.
482. Id. at 822-23.




487. 367 F.3d 1238 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
488. Bussell, 141 Fed App'x. at 823.
489. Id.
490. There was, in the court's opinion, no constructive discharge based on a
precipitating violation of Title VII. Id. at 823.
491. Id.
492. Id.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
VII. Conclusion
The Supreme Court gave important guidance in Burlington
Northern, analyzing and explaining what is meant by retaliation under
Title VII. 493 The justices unanimously held that Burlington Northern
could not subject Shelia White to reassignment or suspension without
harming White and violating employment discrimination law.494 The
Court established that §§ 703(a) and 704(a) are unique, and a standard
that uniformly encompassed violations of both sections would ignore the
distinguishable, illegal conduct intended to be addressed by each section
of the statute.495 The Court's conclusions are encouraging to employees
and endorse employers' commitment to a discrimination-free workplace.
493. See supra Part IV.A.
494. See supra Part IV.A.
495. See supra Part IV.A.
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